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ABSTRACT
Over the past few decades, recycling has gained particular interest due to its beneficial
effects on energy consumption, natural resource availability, and ultimately greenhouse gas
emissions. However, while recycling generates these benefits, the policies enacted have not
captured the potential benefits from materials that yield the highest returns, at least not
consistently over time (e.g. aluminum and plastic beverage containers). This dissertation
evaluates two mainstream recycling policies at the household-level, specifically deposit-refund
systems and curbside recycling programs, to not only theoretically and empirically prove their
positive influence on household recycling behavior, but to establish a temporal element to
help guide policymakers in maintaining these policies over time in order to realize the full
potential of recycling. The analyses provide new evidence on how recycling decisions are
made at the household-level, and how regulators can use these decisions to maximize social
welfare given various implemented recycling policies.
Chapter 2 empirically tests how deposit-refund systems impact household recycling de-
cisions. While it is expected that cash refunds provided by a regulator will positively alter
the household’s recycling decision, the range of data used for this analysis is sampled to
focus on why beverage container redemption rates have declined over a particular time span.
Additionally, it is found that keeping cash refunds constant from their implementation date
result in redemption rate reductions due to time influencing factors, such as inflation and
opportunity costs of recycling. Next, chapter 3 adds the availability of a curbside recycling
program and a fixed amount of landfill space to explain which recycling method is preferred
to a household under growing wages. It is theoretically shown that a household’s recycling
method decision changes over time when wages are expected to increase. Higher wages yield
higher opportunity costs of not working, and therefore, a regulator should switch its subsidy
focus from one policy to another in order to maximize social welfare and the municipality’s
iii
recycling rates. Lastly, chapter 4 builds on the previous chapter to incorporate investment
in waste-to-energy technologies, which provide the additional benefits of a “cleaner” energy
source and slower landfill space depletion compared to traditional landfilling methods. It is
concluded from the theoretical framework that waste-to-energy investments can have neg-
ative effects on recycling rates under a fixed regulator budget. This is because a regulator
must choose between subsidizing recycling and investing in waste-to-energy technologies,
which require large amounts of physical and financial capital. It is also concluded that the
optimal investment time period is to occur once consumption reaches a certain level, and
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MSW, commonly referred to as “garbage” or “household waste”, has increasingly become
of interest to policymakers as population and consumption levels rise. Policymakers have
looked to various forms of solid waste management to control these increasing levels by
implementing consumer and producer-side instruments. Both forms seek to preserve natural
resources by reducing the amount of material in consumer products, promoting recycling,
and converting waste into “cleaner” energy via a combustion process.
While producers inherently seek ways to reduce costs by decreasing the amount of ma-
terial and packaging in their products, they potentially do not account for the downstream
effects their products and packaging have on the environment. Therefore, regulators have
intervened by establishing source reduction goals, subsidizing product design research and
development, and issuing taxes on products to internalize these unaccounted for downstream
effects. Similar economic disincentives can also be applied at the consumer-level. Taxes can
be placed on single-use products to encourage purchases of more durable, reusable goods
(EPA, 1995). Municipalities have also implemented PAYT programs. In contrast to most
municipality waste management fees, where the household pays a flat fee, PAYT programs
impose a tax on the household that is proportional to the disposed quantity to be landfilled.
Recycling policies have gained much attention over the past few decades with growing
public awareness about environmentalism. Policymakers have implemented both local and
national recycling policies to preserve scarce resources and conserve energy. In the U.S., DR
systems and CS recycling programs have been the main avenues for recycling promotion.
DR systems attempt to converge consumption and recycling levels by placing a consumption
tax on a product, and subsequently refunding the tax if the product is returned for the
purposes of recycling. States with DR systems have been noted to generate recycling rates
1
2.5 times higher than states without such systems (BEAR, 2002). CS recycling programs
do not offer a monetary incentive, but instead offer convenience by picking up recyclables
at the household’s place of residence. CS recycling programs have grown in popularity since
the early 1990s, and have recently been reported to service 71 percent of the U.S. population
(EPA, 2014).
The combination of these two methods have contributed to the overall increasing U.S.
recycling rates. However, when recycling rates are disaggregated by product, rates can
vary widely. Specifically, U.S. beverage container recycling rates have dropped 20 percent
compared to their 1990 rates. This declining trend is of particular interest to policymakers,
because beverage containers comprise two-thirds of the total aluminum, glass, and plastic
material recycled in the MSW stream (EPA, 2014).
In order to implement successful policies and maintain them over time, regulators must
consider household behavior. Chapter 2 focuses on DR systems and examines how these
programs fare over time. The household decides to recycle via the DR system by weighing
the costs associated with cleaning, sorting, storing, and returning beverage containers to a
recycling facility against the benefits it receives from cash returns and saving the environ-
ment. With the exception of California, states with DR systems have not increased their cash
refunds since their date of implementation, all while transportation costs and a household’s
value of time (using income as a proxy) have increased. This prompts the question of how
effective are DR systems over time when taking into account inflation, no to little revision to
cash refunds, increasing transportation costs, and increasing value of time? The analysis not
only demonstrates that cash refunds encourage household recycling behavior, but that cash
refunds over time matter. Simply adjusting the cash refund for inflation can result in an
increase of hundreds of millions of beverage containers recycled via the DR system annually.
Chapter 3 expands the notion of updating cash refunds over time in DR municipalities
to allow for a substitute recycling policy (i.e. a CS recycling program). As previously
suggested, the two recycling methods have been noted to work as complementary programs
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to maximize a municipality’s recycling rate. However at the household-level, these policies
are deemed substitutes, albeit not perfect ones. The goal of chapter 3 is to first illustrate the
methods of which households choose to recycle when wages are growing, either recycling via
the DR system or via the CS recycling program, when there is no consideration for landfill
space. With DR systems offering cash refunds to supplement household total income, it is
theoretically shown that if a household starts below some wage threshold, the household will
recycle more via the DR system. The second goal of chapter 3 is to determine the optimal
subsidy levels for each program, provided the actions of the household and a fixed amount
of landfill space. Recycling subsidies come in the forms of either increasing the cash refund
households receive per unit recycled via the DR system, or by decreasing the per unit time
it takes a household to recycle via the CS recycling program. The latter can be a scenario
where a regulator takes on the burden of cleaning and/or sorting the household’s recyclables.
Lastly, regulators have looked to waste incineration, or WTE, to generate a “cleaner” form
of energy and slow down landfill depletion. WTE technologies currently remove 11.7 percent
of the waste generated in the U.S., helping reduce waste sent to landfills from 69.8 percent in
1990 to 53.6 percent in 2011 (EPA, 2014). Although this method has environmental benefits,
it is the more controversial topic. It is argued that such technology investments promote
consumption, working against source reduction plans and a zero-waste goal. In addition,
WTE plants are stated to work in opposition to recycling policies, as both achieve the same
goal of lowering landfill rates. In chapter 4, this controversial topic is explored to identify
optimal investment times of WTE technologies given the actions of the household under
growing wages, availability of a recycling program, and a fixed amount of landfill space.
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CHAPTER 2
DETERMINANTS OF REDEMPTION RATES OVER TIME: AN EMPIRICAL
BEVERAGE CONTAINER RECYCLING STUDY
Co-author: Roderick G. Eggert
This chapter measures the effects of cash refunds and opportunity costs of recycling
on redemption rates over time using U.S. state data. Results indicate that cash refunds
positively influence recycling via the DR system. However, the opportunity costs of recycling,
which is estimated to be equal to household income, significantly reduce the positive influence
from cash refunds. The outweighing effect of household income on redemption rates is then
linked to the decline in redemption rates in the U.S. from the early-1990s to early-2000s.
2.1 Overview
Beverage container recycling rates in the U.S. have steadily declined from 1990 to 2007
(see Figure 2.1).1 On average over this time period, beverage containers represent two-thirds
of the thousands of tons of aluminum, glass, and plastic recycled. In terms of recycled ma-
terial composition, aluminum and glass beverage containers comprise as much as 98 percent
and 90 percent of their respective material (EPA, 2014). DR systems have been noted to
play a significant role in generating high levels of beverage container recycling by targeting
specific materials to be recycled (see Lave et al., 1999). It has been documented that states
with DR systems recycle 71.6 percent, while states without DR systems recycle only 27.9
percent of their beverage containers (BEAR, 2002). However, how effective are DR systems
over time with inflation, no to little revision to cash refunds, increasing transportation costs,
and increasing opportunity costs of recycling?
1The U.S. EPA reports all materials in thousands of tons. To convert into number of beverage containers,
aluminum, glass and plastic values were multiplied by 2000 and then by the number of containers in a pound;
28.7, 1.86, and 15.7, respectively. Materials were summed, and then the recycled values were divided by the
generated values to get beverage container recycling rates over time. Sources: U.S. EPA and California’s



















































Figure 2.1: U.S. Beverage Container Recycling Rates
The U.S. currently has ten states with mandatory deposits on specific beverage container
types.2 All cash refunds have remained the same since their respective dates of implementa-
tion, with the exception of California. California has increased their cash refund three times
since the system has been implemented.3
DR systems work as follows. Initially, the DR system taxes the consumption of a bever-
age. The tax will then be refunded to the household if the beverage container is returned to a
recycling center.4 The tax is similar to a Pigouvian tax in that it seeks to tax the household
a rate equal to the marginal social damage of waste disposal (Pigou, 1920). The difference
is that rather than placing the tax at the point of disposal/landfill, the tax is only placed on
households who do not redeem their beverage containers. The benefit of DR systems over
2All U.S. deposit states cover all beer, malt, and carbonated soft drinks. In addition to these covered
beverage types, California’s DR system includes wine, distilled spirits, and all non-alcoholic beverages
excluding milk. Connecticut covers bottled water. New York covers both bottled water and wine coolers.
Hawaii includes wine coolers, wine, liquor, and mineral water. Massachusetts includes mineral water, and
Michigan contains mineral water, wine coolers and canned cocktails. Vermont covers both mixed wine and
liquor. Lastly, Oregon’s DR system includes all beverages including bottled water, but excluding wine,
liquor, milk, and milk substitutes (CRI, 2013).
3California’s DR system was implemented in 1987 with a deposit amount of 1 cent. The law was then
amended in 1990 to 2.5 cents for containers less than 24 ounces, and 5 cents for containers greater than 24
ounces. The deposit was again amended in 2004 to 4 cents for containers less than 24 ounces, and 8 cents
for containers greater than 24 ounces. The current law is 5 cents for containers less than 24 ounces and 10
cents for containers greater than 24 ounces, which was established in 2007 (CRI, 2013).
4Recycling centers are generally defined as privately owned businesses whose sole purpose is redemption.
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a true Pigouvian tax is that DR systems reduce the initiative to illegally dump waste (see
Palmer & Walls, 1997; Palmer et al., 1997; Ashenmiller, 2009). The presence of CS recycling
programs yield the potential of the deposit acting as a strict consumption tax, because the
household may choose to recycle via the CS recycling program or another means that does
not refund the deposit (e.g. drop off sites).
Studies have shown DR systems to be more cost effective and efficient compared to other
recycling policies, such as advance disposal fees and recycling subsidies (see Dinan, 1993;
Fullerton & Kinnaman, 1995; Sigman, 1995; Palmer & Walls, 1997; Acuff & Kaffine, 2013).
However, little empirical work has been done with regards to cash refunds and opportunity
costs of recycling from DR systems. Most of the empirical research that has been conducted
has been survey-based. For example, Bell et al. (2010) found that DR systems influence water
bottle recycling more than any other legal regime (e.g. mandatory recycling, opportunities
to recycle, recycling plans, and recycling goals).
Several other studies have focused on the opportunity costs associated with recycling (see
Halvorsen & Kipperberg, 2003; Halvorsen, 2008; Ashenmiller, 2009). Each of these studies
utilized surveys to conclude that higher opportunity costs of recycling yield lower recycling
rates. Although opportunity costs of recycling are not exactly equal to the wage rate, it
is noted that income and opportunity costs are positively correlated.5 Viscusi et al. (2013)
found that higher income households contribute less to recycling centers (i.e. redeeming for
cash), because their time is worth more than lower income households and they simply do not
find it worth their time to make a “special” trip to a recycling center. In addition, making a
“special” trip to a recycling center can prove to use more energy and resources than it saves
(see Lave et al., 1999). However, trips might be deemed “not special” when retailers (e.g.
grocery stores) participate in their respective state’s DR system and are capable of accepting
beverage containers for redemption, because the trip to the grocery store would have been
5Shaw (1992) showed that one’s wage rate is not exactly equal to one’s value of time, because individuals
may allocate their time differently at different times of the year. Instead, wage is equal to the ratio of the
shadow price of time to the shadow price on the budget constraint.
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made regardless.6 In this case, transportation costs, both explicit gasoline and the time it
takes to make the trip, can be rendered insignificant.
This study differs from the previous studies in that it incorporates a time dimension to
explain changes in redemption rates, with a focus on the decline period from the early 1990s
to early 2000s (as shown in Figure 2.2). It is hypothesized that these rates have declined
because cash refunds have declined at the rate of inflation, trip costs, both opportunity






































































Figure 2.2: Redemption Rates Over Time by State
Sources: California Department of Resources, Recycling and Recovery; Massachusetts Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection; Michigan Department of Treasury; and New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation
6Since retailers are do not have the sole purpose of redeeming beverage containers, they generally will have
smaller capacities compared to redemption centers. Retailers sometimes limit the quantities or dollars paid
to customers in a day. For example in New York, redemption centers (or in general, dealers) are able to
limit the number of beverage containers they accept from any one customer in a day (or trip) to 240 or
72, depending on the square footage of the business (NY, 1982). In addition, Oregon law permits dealers
to refuse to accept more than 50 individual beverage containers from any one person during one day (Ore,
1983).
7Beatty et al. (2007) empirically showed that the benefits of curbside recycling may be over estimated when
in the presence of multiple recycling modes such as DR systems, because curbside recycling transfers what
would have been recycled via the DR system; hence “can”nibalization from one mode of recycling to another.
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Various states employ strategies to manage recycling and redemption rates. For example,
California has increased cash refunds three times since the implementation of their DR
system. Not surprisingly, the years with upticks in redemption rates, as shown in Figure 2.2,
directly correspond to the years that cash refunds were increased (see footnote 3). Also in
Figure 2.2, note Michigan’s high and relatively stable redemption rates over time. The figure
suggests that Michigan’s $0.10 cash refund holds its value with inflation more than the $0.05
cash refund of Massachusetts and New York. In 2004 though, Michigan paired its $0.10
cash refund with a command and control approach that prevents containers from entering
the MSW stream.8 Iowa has a similar command and control addition to that of Michigan,
but it only applies to dealers, distributors, manufacturers, or a person operating a recycling
center, and not to individuals (Iow, 1999). The command and control approach could have
some explanatory power in why Michigan’s rates have remained relatively stable over the
time beginning in 2004. For the purposes of this chapter, the various command and control
approaches are not empirically tested.
U.S. data for California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York from 1984 to 2010 is
used to estimate the effects that real cash refunds, real opportunity costs of recycling, real
explicit transportation costs, and warm glow or “green” identity have on redemption rates.9
All real cash refunds and real costs will henceforth be referred to as cash refunds and costs.
The panel regression analysis finds similar magnitudes across specifications regarding the
effect of percent changes in cash refunds on percent changes in redemption rates. Oppor-
tunity costs of recycling vary in magnitude across specifications, but the negative effect of
opportunity costs of recycling outweigh the positive influence of cash refunds in each speci-
fication. This greater magnitude on opportunity costs of recycling provide insight as to why
8See Michigan’s Public Act 34 of 2004. A person shall not knowingly deliver to a landfill for disposal, or,
if the person is an owner or operator of a landfill, knowingly permit disposal in the landfill...subject to
subsection (4), more than a de minimis amount of open, empty, or otherwise used beverage containers. As
by Sec. 301 from Michigan’s Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, a person is defined as an
individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental entity, or other legal entity. The subsection
(4) just excludes green glass beverage containers before June 1, 2007 (Mic, 2004).
9Akerlof & Kranton (2000) showed how one’s identity can influence economic outcomes in a game-theoretic
framework.
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redemption rates have fallen over the time period from 1990 to 2000. If policymakers seek
to increase beverage container redemption rates, and thereby increase recycling rates, cash
refunds must increase. While CS recycling programs have been shown to increase recycling,
it is complementary to DR systems (Ashenmiller, 2009), and one that does not increase
recycling rates by as much as DR systems (BEAR, 2002).
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 develops the conceptual
framework that analytically explains how cash refunds, opportunity costs of recycling, gaso-
line costs, and “green” identity influence the quantity recycled via the DR system. Sections
2.3 and 2.4 then discuss the data and estimation methodology used to empirically test the
conceptual framework. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 provide the estimation results and the implica-
tions for public policy. Section 2.7 then illustrates alternative estimation methods to account
for possible cointegration using panel FMOLS. Finally, section 2.8 concludes the chapter and
suggests areas for further exploration.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
This section presents the conceptual framework that will be used to analytically explain
the expected empirical results. It builds off of the framework set by Viscusi et al. (2011) to
include pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits, transportation costs and per unit time costs.
To begin, consider a representative household who seeks to maximize utility by choosing the






Optimization is subject to both a budget and time constraint. The budget constraint
contains the price of consumption, which is set as the numeraire, and embeds the beverage
container deposit/tax. The budget constraint also includes the cash refund θt, which is
received on a per container basis. Therefore, the representative household will receive θt
for every dt returned. The last price incorporated in the budget constraint is the explicit
transportation costs it takes to make the trip to a recycling center (e.g. the price of gasoline
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per trip et). Since the representative household does not make decisions to return beverage
containers on a per container basis, the decision to clean, sort, and store beverage containers
is made in advance. To put this into perspective, households generally have a separate
receptacle located next to their waste bin to collect the beverage containers they plan to
clean, sort, and store. When the receptacle fills up, households make the trip to the recycling
center provided the costs are justified. Usually if the decision to separate certain items is
made, then the household has already weighed the benefits and costs of redeeming the
beverage containers for cash. Households also prefer to take the most they can fit into their
vehicle, or as much as the recycling center will allow per trip (see footnote 6 for an example
on the maximum containers accepted by a recycling center in a day).
Since transportation costs are not on a per container basis, but rather a per trip basis,
costs can be spread over the number of containers the household returns to the recycling
center. Again, the household prefers to return the maximum. Trips to recycling centers in a





where d is the maximum quantity of beverage containers a household’s vehicle can hold or
the maximum quantity per day a recycling center will take from a single household. The
budget constraint is then




where yt is income, and a household can add to its income if beverage containers are redeemed
at a recycling center for θt per container dt.
The household’s time constraint is based on h, the quantity of time in a given period.
Given the amount of time, the household can divvy up that time for leisure `t, time spent




, and time spent working, which is set equal to the
household’s income yt. Time spent performing recycling activities includes the time spent
cleaning, sorting, storing, and returning the beverage containers to a recycling center. It is a
10
function of how many beverage containers the household redeems for cash, where ∂f/∂dt > 0
and ∂2f/∂d2t ≥ 0.10 The household’s time constraint is





Rearranging (2.3) and (2.4) allow for ct and `t to be written in terms of dt. Specifically,








. The household’s maximization problem can



































The household will then redeem beverage containers for cash up to the point where
the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of redeeming beverage containers for cash.





θt. Non-pecuniary benefits are the psychological benefits that the











where the first term is the explicit marginal cost associated with driving to the recycling
center, and the second term is the marginal opportunity cost of time associated with recy-
cling. The implicit function theorem allows for demonstration of how cash refunds, the price






































The denominator is negative-definite, because ∂2Ut/∂d
2
t is negative due to the conditions






being positive or equal to zero. The latter is
positive, because ∂Ut/∂`t and ∂
2Ut/∂d
2
t are positive from the conditions for a maximum,






The data used for this chapter is an unbalanced panel data set that contains annual data
from California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York from 1984 to 2010. Redemption
rates reported cover all beverage containers in that respective state’s DR system. Data
for redemption rates was supplied by the California Department of Resources, Recycling,
and Recovery, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, the Michigan
Treasury Department, and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation.
Across these four states and over the varying time periods, the average redemption rate is
78.33 percent.
State cash refund data was taken from the Bottle Bill Resource Guide. As noted earlier,
cash refunds have only changed for California. PCPI was used as a proxy for the opportunity
cost of recycling. This data was taken from the Federal Bank of Saint Louis’ FRED database.
Average gasoline end user prices (i.e. regular, mid-grade, premium) were used from the U.S.
EIA. For the year 1988, average end user prices were not available, therefore retail outlet
prices were used for each state. The values for the remaining years were not significantly
different from one another. Cash refunds, PCPI, and gasoline prices were then deflated using
each respective state’s CPI, rebased in 2010 terms.
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SC members as a percent of the population will serve as a proxy for the psychological
benefit that the household receives from its own “green” identity.11 SC members include
people who pay membership fees, and those who do not pay annual membership fees but
have either volunteered with SC or even signed a SC petition. As noted in Mrozek (2000),
this “measure is not an ideal measure of preferences, however, for part of the benefit of
membership consists of participation in activities sponsored by local chapters.”
All variables were then log-transformed to reduce any outliers. Therefore, coefficients in
level form can be interpreted as elasticities. Table 2.1 reflects the log-transformed descriptive
statistics. In the remainder of this chapter, variables will be referred to in their level form
for reading ease (e.g. log of redemption rate will be redemption rate).
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics - Log Levels
Obs. Mean Std. Error Min. Max. Jarque-Bera
Redemption Rate 89 4.35 0.16 4.01 4.61 2.23
Cash Refund 105 1.97 0.53 0.57 2.99 1.39
PCPI 108 10.58 0.15 10.20 10.87 1.87
Gasoline Price 108 0.41 0.30 -0.21 1.08 5.85*
SC/Population 108 -1.35 0.54 -2.54 -0.36 3.91
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels of the Jarque-Bera test,
respectively.
2.4 Estimation Methodology
This section goes through the estimation methodology. First, the presence of unit roots
were tested using the Im et al. (2003) procedure. Based on finding the presence of unit
roots, Pedroni (1999) panel cointegration tests were performed with common time dummies
to account for cross-sectional dependencies. The test finds high probabilities of failing to
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Therefore, a first-differenced model is used to
analyze the effects of percent changes in cash refunds, opportunity costs of recycling, gasoline
11Mrozek (2000) used the fraction of people in a jurisdiction that are SC members to measure citizen
preferences. The number of SC members are “presumed to correlate highly with attitudes toward the
environment and, specifically, recycling.”
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costs, and SC members as a percent of the population on percent changes in redemption rates.
2.4.1 Unit Roots
The Im et al. (2003) panel unit root test was used to test for the presence of unit roots
(see Table 2.2). Three tests for each series were performed: one with a constant, one with a
constant and a time trend, and one differenced with a constant. The maximum number of




, and the actual lag selection was
chosen that minimized the AIC. The test has a null hypothesis of a unit root. It is found
that in the case of just a constant, all variables contain a unit root with the exception of
the cash refund. In the case with a constant and a time trend, only the redemption rate
suggests rejection of the null. The general equation estimated is
∆yi,t = αi + ζit+ βiyi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
θi,j∆yi,t−j + εi,t; i = 1, 2, 3, 4; t = 1, . . . , T. (2.7)
Table 2.2: Unit Root Test Results - Log Levels
Level, ζi = 0 Level, ζi 6= 0 Differenced, ζi = 0
ztbar zt̃bar ztbar zt̃bar ztbar zt̃bar
Redemption Rate 0.10 0.01 -1.79* -1.20 -7.02*** -4.46***
[0.54] [0.50] [0.04] [0.11] [0.00] [0.00]
Cash Refund -3.54*** -3.09*** 0.91 1.10 -3.53*** -2.78***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.82] [0.86] [0.00] [0.00]
PCPI 0.08 0.05 -0.33 -0.18 -4.93*** -4.01***
[0.53] [0.52] [0.37] [0.43] [0.00] [0.00]
Gasoline Price 0.69 0.59 -1.33* -1.01 -7.51*** -5.32***
[0.76] [0.72] [0.09] [0.16] [0.00] [0.00]
SC/Population -0.15 -0.07 1.08 1.12 -4.19*** -3.62***
[0.44] [0.47] [0.86] [0.87] [0.00] [0.00]
Notes: Numbers reported in brackets, [ ], are p-values. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent levels, respectively. Zt̃bar statistic assumes no serial correlation in the individual errors of the
Dickey-Fuller regressions (see Im et al., 2003).
It is known that in small samples such as this one, the tests do not carry much explanatory
power. All variables will be treated as integrated of order 1, denoted I(1). Therefore, before
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differencing the data, the presence of cointegration will be tested using Pedroni (1999).
2.4.2 Cointegration
Pedroni (1999) cointegration tests with common time dummies were performed for six
specifications with and without time trends. Common time dummies were included to ac-
count for cross-sectional dependencies by subtracting off sample averages. The regressions
performed in Table 2.3 follow the equation
yi,t = αi + ζit+ β1ix1i,t + +β2ix2i,t + . . .+ βmixmi,t + εi,t, (2.8)
where t is time [1984, 2010], i is the cross-section [1, 4], and m is the number of regressors
varying from 1 to 4. In Table 2.3, seven statistics are reported. The first four statistics (panel)
are within-dimesion, and the last 3 statistics (group) are between-dimension. The two types
differ in the way the estimators are pooled. Within-dimension “pool the auto-regressive
coefficient across different members for the unit root tests on the estimated residuals,” while
between-dimension “simply average the individually estimated coefficients for each member
i” Pedroni (1999).12 The cointegration tests mostly concludes that the null hypothesis of
no cointegration is unable to be rejected. Therefore, the estimation method calls for a
first-differenced model.
2.5 Model Specification and Estimation Results
Since all variables have been diagnosed to be I(1) and not to have a cointegrating relation-
ship that makes redemption rates stationary, a first-differenced model needs to be specified.
First-differencing eliminates any time or state fixed effects. Time fixed effects could account
for national increases in curbside recycling, while state fixed effects could be that particu-
lar state’s feeling towards “green-ness” or recycling that SC members as a percent of the
population does not pick up. The general first-differenced specification is
∆yi,t = β∆xi,t + εi,t. (2.9)
12See Table 1 in Pedroni (1999) for specific calculations of within-dimension and between-dimension statistics.
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Table 2.3: Pedroni Cointegration Test Results with Common Time Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0
Panel v 0.87 -0.57 0.32 -0.88 -0.12 -1.24 -0.37 -1.47 0.28 -0.90 0.55 -0.76
Panel ρ -0.64 0.20 0.12 0.88 0.71 1.51 1.12 1.95 0.14 0.93 -0.10 0.80
Panel pp -0.78 -0.08 -0.31 0.37 0.19 1.06 0.44 1.46 -0.17 0.61 -0.43 0.25
Panel adf -1.32* -0.63 -1.36* 0.20 -1.01 0.87 0.22 1.28 -0.78 0.08 -0.52 0.02
Group ρ 0.43 1.10 1.12 1.71 1.74 2.36 2.12 2.80 1.17 1.80 0.84 1.59
Group pp -0.13 0.64 0.40 1.01 1.03 1.80 1.23 2.19 0.64 1.38 0.21 0.82
Group adf -0.88 -0.05 -1.10 0.71 -0.62 1.55 0.85 1.91 -0.35 0.76 0.13 0.76
Notes: The Pedroni cointegration test is a one-tailed test. All tests are left hand sided tests, with the exception of panel v. Statistics reported are
normally distributed; *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Specifications (1) only contain the log of real
cash refund as a potential regressor. Specifications (2) include the log of real cash refunds and the log of real per capita personal income (PCPI) as
regressors. Specifications (3) are the same as specifications (2), but include the log of real price of gasoline. Specifications (4) include all four potential
regressors (i.e. including specifications (3) plus the log of Sierra Club members as a percent of the population). Specification (5) includes the log of
real cash refund and the log of real price of gasoline, while specification (6) includes the log of real cash refund and the log of Sierra Club members as
a percent of the population.
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Table 2.4 shows the results from the first-differenced estimation with the regressand as
the differenced log of redemption rates. Since all variables are in differenced log form, the
coefficients are interpreted as percent changes. As expected from the conceptual framework,
the cash refund positively affects redemption rates. Increases to the cash refund incentivize
households, who were previously indifferent or on the margin about redeeming beverage
containers for cash, to now redeem for cash. This is because households on the margin now
have marginal benefits that are greater than or equal to the marginal costs associated with
redeeming their beverage containers for cash. Note that across all specifications, cash refund
is always positive significant and does not change much in magnitude. An increase in the
percent change of the cash refund reflects, on average across the specifications shown, a 0.24
percent change increase in redemption rates.
Table 2.4: First-Differenced Estimation: Full Sample - Log Differenced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash Refund 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(27.39) (15.62) (13.21) (10.80) (16.09) (14.60)
PCPI -0.47 -0.41* -0.32
(-1.62) (-1.69) (-1.54)




Degrees of Freedom 84 83 82 81 83 83
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.30
AIC -3.42 -3.48 -3.47 -3.48 -3.43 -3.46
BIC -3.39 -3.42 -3.38 -3.37 -3.38 -3.40
Note: Numbers reported in parenthesis, ( ), are t-values. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent levels, respectively. All t-values reported are calculated using clustered standard errors.
Also as expected, PCPI negatively affects redemption rates. If a household’s time be-
comes more valuable, then the opportunity costs of cleaning, sorting, storing, and returning
the beverage containers to a recycling center increase, thus making it more costly for a
household to redeem for cash. The empirics reflect that a percent change increase in PCPI
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yields a decrease in the percent change of redemption rates that varies from 0.32 to 0.47. In
specification (3), the coefficient on PCPI was significant at the the 10 percent level, while
the other two specifications yield borderline significant results.
As for the gasoline price, it is insignificant but with the expected sign. The conceptual
framework advocated that rising gasoline costs make redemption for cash more costly, reduc-
ing redemption rates. However, an insignificant but correct sign on the coefficient of the real
gasoline price suggests that cash recyclers might be returning their beverage containers at
retail stores. As mentioned earlier, gasoline prices will be deemed insignificant if households
return their beverage containers to retail stores (e.g. grocery stores), because the trip would
have been made regardless. Even if this regressor was deemed significant, its magnitude on
the percent change in redemption rates would be so small relative to the percent change in
PCPI. The results reflect that households are more sensitive to increases in the opportunity
costs of recycling, rather than gasoline prices, when deciding to redeem beverage containers
for cash. The lower sensitivity of the percent change in real gasoline prices could be from
it being more variable than the percent change in PCPI (see Figure 2.3). Recycling behav-
iors, or even behaviors in general, can be slow to change over time. Therefore, if a decision
variable such as the percent change in gasoline prices is not sustained at high levels and
fluctuates frequently, then behaviors will not be as quick to change.
The psychological benefit is surprisingly negative significant. While this is an extremely
small amount, because the largest ratio of SC members to population is 0.70, it is still
negative. It is thought that this negative sign could be explained through CS recycling
“can”nibalization from the DR system (see Beatty et al., 2007). As a state’s identity becomes
more “green”, access to CS recycling could increase, reducing the percent redeemed for cash.
Mrozek (2000) discusses such a result, where increases to SC members as a percent of a
jurisdiction result in increases to the percent of households in that jurisdiction who receive
CS service. If increases to SC members as a percent of the population yield higher percentages
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Figure 2.3: California Fluctuations of DLog Real Gasoline Prices and DLog Real PCPI from
1990 to 2010
systems.
Specifically looking at the coefficient magnitudes, the net benefit of redeeming bever-
age containers for cash over time is negative. The magnitudes of the opportunity cost of
recycling (PCPI) and CS recycling access effects via increases in a state’s “green” identity
clearly outweigh the pecuniary benefits one receives from taking the beverage containers to
a recycling center. This reflects the decline in redemption rates from 1990 to 2000. However,
since California updated their cash refund over this time period and with percent changes
in PCPI falling in 2000 across all four states, it is expected that the net benefit be more
negative over the sample period from 1990 to 2000. Table 2.5 shows the same regressions as
Table 2.4, but over the sample period from 1990 to 2000.
The significance on cash refunds do not drastically change from the two samples, but the
coefficients on PCPI become more negative. Thus, since the magnitude of the coefficients
on cash refund does not change significantly, the gap between cash refund, PCPI, and SC
members as a percent of the population increases.
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Table 2.5: First-Differenced Estimation: Sample 1990 to 2000 - Log Differenced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash Refund 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.26***
(27.57) (19.79) (13.43) (15.61) (16.77) (16.21)
PCPI -0.66** -0.60** -0.51*
(-2.00) (-2.23) (-1.78)




Degrees of Freedom 41 40 39 38 40 40
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.35
AIC -3.17 -3.27 -3.26 -3.23 -3.19 -3.20
BIC -3.13 -3.18 -3.14 -3.07 -3.10 -3.11
Note: Numbers reported in parenthesis, ( ), are t-values. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent levels, respectively. All t-values reported are calculated using clustered standard errors.
2.6 Implications for Public Policy
From the previous section, it was found that a one percent change increase in cash refunds
correspond to a 0.22 to 0.25 percent change increase in redemption rates. Yet what does this
translate to in terms of the quantity of beverage containers that could have been recycled
via the DR system if cash refunds had kept pace with inflation?
In order to carry out this calculation, each state’s respective implementation year was
considered to be the intended cash refund. Real cash refunds decline every year at the
rate of inflation until an adjustment to the cash refund is made. For example, Massachusetts
implemented their DR system in 1983. The $0.05 in 1983 then declined every year at the rate
of inflation, where the $0.05 would be approximately $0.021 in 2010. A state like California
however, had an implementation cash refund of $0.01 in 1987. The $0.01 declined at the
rate of inflation for 1988 and 1989. Then in 1990, the cash refund was increased to $0.025.
The $0.025 declined until 2004, when the cash refund was updated again. Figure 2.4 reflects







































































Figure 2.4: California Cash Refund Changes Over Time
Next, the percent increase needed to keep cash refunds at their originally intended value




− 1. This percent increase
was multiplied by 0.24 to reflect what the redemption rate would have been if cash refunds
had kept pace with inflation. This rate was then multiplied by the quantity of sales to
convert the percentage into quantities. Using the proposed returns and subtracting off the
original provides the difference in returns or additional beverage containers to be recycled
via the DR system.
The actual and proposed redemption rates for California are shown in Figure 2.5. The
difference in the redemption rate for California from 1988 to 2010 corresponds to an average
of an additional 350 million beverage containers per year that would have been recycled via
the DR system if cash refunds had kept up with inflation. Figure 2.5 also reflects how many
additional beverage containers per capita would have been recycled via the DR system. Note
that in 1990, 2004, and 2007, the difference between the proposed and actual is zero. This















































































Figure 2.5: California Original Redemption Rates vs. Inflation-Adjusted Redemption Rates
with Gained Beverage Containers per Capita
The other states that have not updated their cash refunds since their implementation date
simply have diverging actual and proposed redemption rates over time.13 Table 2.6 shows the
average additional returns (or difference in returns) and average beverage containers added
per capita per year for each state examined.
Table 2.6: Average Increases in Quantities Recycled via the DR System
Implementation Time Avg. Additional Avg. Additional







Massachusetts 1983: $0.05 1990-2010 317,588,849 50
Michigan 1978: $0.10 1990-2010 119,428,571 12
New York 1983: $0.05 1984-2007 634,803,125 34
The average added number of beverage containers recycled via the Massachusetts DR
system reaches over 317 million beverage containers per year. Michigan has a relatively
13Or until the redemption rate exceeds 100 percent, as in the case of Michigan.
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low average added number of beverage containers, because Michigan already has such high
redemption rates and the upper limit is bound at 100 percent. However, in one year, Michigan
reported a redemption rate greater than 100 percent. Even though $0.10 holds its value
longer than $0.05, Michigan implemented their DR system in the late 1970s. That $0.10 in
1978 is only worth $0.03 by 2010, because of inflation over 32 years. Therefore, to return
to the $0.10, cash refunds must be increased by 226 percent, which results in a 54 percent
increase in redemption rates. Again, this value is constrained to 100 percent (with the
exception of 1992), so cash refunds need not be increased by 226 percent to achieve a 100
percent redemption rate. Thus every year, Michigan’s redemption rate would have reached
its maximum limit if the $0.10 would have kept up with inflation, where the quantity returned
via the DR system is equal to the quantity consumed or sold. As for New York, the average
quantity improvement is simply sheer volume. For example, New York has a maximum
quantity consumed of 6.2 billion beverage containers in a year, while Massachusetts has
a maximum of 2.2 billion beverage containers in a year. However, on average per capita,
Massachusetts is recorded to have a larger increase in the quantity recycled via the DR
system than New York.
2.7 Further Exploration
Pedroni (1999) panel cointegration tests were also performed without common time dum-
mies (see Table 2.7). Excluding common time dummies leaves cross-sectional disturbances
as shared (Pedroni, 1999). Note that the presence of cointegration is found across all specifi-
cations with the exception of the last specification, which regressed redemption rates on real
cash refunds and SC members as a percent of the population. For this specification, exclu-
sion of the time trend made all seven statistics insignificant, yielding no statistical evidence
of a cointegrating relationship.
With cointegration present, it is not appropriate to estimate specifications with panel
OLS. While panel OLS estimators benefit from properties of super-consistency, they suffer
from abnormal distributions which invalidate hypothesis testing. Therefore, specifications
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Table 2.7: Pedroni Cointegration Test Results without Common Time Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0 ζi = 0 ζi 6= 0
Panel v 1.44* 0.06 1.55* 0.27 1.20 0.18 0.79 -0.03 1.31* -0.15 -0.12 0.12
Panel ρ -1.63* -0.83 -1.34* -0.49 -0.42 0.18 -0.22 0.03 -1.01 -0.18 -0.09 -0.81
Panel pp -1.78** -1.55* -2.30** -2.35*** -1.40* -1.70** -2.40*** -3.74*** -1.56* -1.30* -0.91 -3.13***
Panel adf -1.25 -0.75 -2.79*** -3.01*** -1.46* -1.27 -3.04*** -2.92*** -0.84 -0.63 -0.62 -1.91**
Group ρ -0.64 0.11 -0.61 0.25 0.33 0.98 0.64 0.75 -0.07 0.66 0.29 -0.16
Group pp -1.39* -1.06 -2.21** -2.04** -1.14 -1.23 -2.02** -3.53*** -1.08 -0.80 -1.13 -3.48***
Group adf -0.74 -0.38 -2.50*** -2.49*** -1.01 -0.80 -3.26*** -2.68*** -0.27 -0.46 -1.07 -2.36***
Notes: The Pedroni cointegration test is a one-tailed test. All tests are left hand sided tests, with the exception of panel v. Statistics reported are
normally distributed; *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Specifications (1) only contain the log of real
cash refund as a potential regressor. Specifications (2) include the log of real cash refunds and the log of real per capita personal income (PCPI) as
regressors. Specifications (3) are the same as specifications (2), but include the log of real price of gasoline. Specifications (4) include all four potential
regressors (i.e. including specifications (3) plus the log of Sierra Club members as a percent of the population). Specification (5) includes the log of
real cash refund and the log of real price of gasoline, while specification (6) includes the log of real cash refund and the log of Sierra Club members as
a percent of the population.
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should then be estimated using panel FMOLS. Panel FMOLS produces asymptotically unbi-
ased estimators, while “produc[ing] nuisance parameter free standard normal distributions.”
In other words, panel FMOLS provides normal distributions to allow for valid hypothesis
testing, which allows for inferences to be made about “common long run relationships.” The
values reported in Table 2.8 are the group mean or between-dimension estimators, which
“provide consistent point estimates of the sample mean of the heterogeneous cointegrating
vectors” (Pedroni, 2001).
Table 2.8: Panel FMOLS Estimation - Log Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash Refund 0.25*** 0.15* 0.17** 0.12** 0.33*** 0.15***
(6.94) (1.68) (2.38) (2.29) (7.75) (4.55)
PCPI -0.64*** -0.48*** -0.45***
(-5.71) (-3.53) (-5.84)




Note: Numbers reported in parenthesis, ( ), are t-values. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Since values are reported in logs, the coefficients can now be interpreted as long run
elasticities. Notice that in specification (1), the magnitude and significance of the percent
change of cash refund is similar to that of what was observed in the first-differenced model
specifications. However, cumulatively adding PCPI, gasoline price, and SC members as a
percent of the population in specifications (2) through (4) reduces the explanatory power
and magnitudes that cash refunds have on redemption rates. Furthermore, the significance
and sign of PCPI and SC members as a percent of the population remains the same, where
the long run PCPI elasticity of redemption rates ranges from 0.45 to 0.64. In addition, the
real gasoline price elasticity is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. It reflects that
explicit transportation costs do sometimes matter to households when deciding to redeem
beverage containers for cash. In this case, the household would be expected to make a
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“special” trip to a recycling center instead of a “not special” trip to a grocery store.
In specification (5), the long run cash refund elasticity is more elastic compared to spec-
ification (1). Lastly, in specification (4), the long run cash refund elasticity is more inelastic
compared to the other specifications containing cash refunds. Also, the coefficient on SC
members as a percent of the population is -0.27. From the earlier section, the negative sign on
SC members as a percent of the population can be interpreted as a state’s increased “green-
ness”, which induces CS recycling and “can”nibalizes from the DR system (see Mrozek, 2000;
Beatty et al., 2007).
2.8 Concluding Remarks
Over the last few decades, landfill space has received growing attention due to an ever in-
creasing population. To mitigate landfill space issues as well as to conserve natural resources
(e.g. aluminum in cans and oil in plastic bottles), recycling has gained increased attention.
Studies have shown both theoretically and empirically that DR systems are similar to a
Pigouvian tax without the drawback of promoting illegal disposal, while generating high
levels of recycling (see Palmer & Walls, 1997; Palmer et al., 1997; BEAR, 2002; Ashenmiller,
2009).
This study found that real cash refunds positively influence redemption rates, while real
opportunity costs of recycling negatively impact redemption rates. Real PCPI, or equiva-
lently the real opportunity costs of recycling, significantly outweigh the positive pecuniary
benefits of real cash refunds. Percent changes in the real cash refund increase percent changes
in redemption rates on average by 0.24, while percent changes in real PCPI decrease percent
changes in redemption rates between 0.32 and 0.47.
In addition, this chapter showed that adjusting cash refunds for inflation can on average
result in an additional hundreds of millions of beverage containers recycled via the DR system
annually. Therefore, by using a panel data set, analysis not only demonstrates that cash
refunds positively influence recycling behavior, but that temporal cash refunds matter.
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Future research for this chapter could extend this model to include population served
by CS in order to confirm the findings of Beatty et al. (2007), and the negative impact of
SC members as a percent of the population on DR systems. Also, this model does not take
into account income distribution effects such as lower income households contributing more
to DR systems than higher income households (see Ashenmiller, 2009). Finally, it would be
beneficial to explore the various beverage container command and control policies across the
U.S. to examine how these approaches impact redemption or recycling rates.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFECTS OF GROWING WAGES ON A HOUSEHOLD’S RECYCLING METHOD
DECISION
Co-authors: Harrison G. Fell and Daniel T. Kaffine
In the U.S., states with DR systems also provide the option of CS recycling. The two
recycling methods have been noted to work as complementary programs to maximize mu-
nicipal recycling rates. However at the household, they are deemed substitutes, albeit not
perfect ones. The goal of this chapter is to first illustrate how households choose to recycle
when wages are growing, either recycling via the DR system or via the CS recycling program
when there is no consideration for available landfill space. Recycling via the DR system adds
to the household’s labor income by providing a cash refund per unit recycled. CS recycling
programs do not offer such a monetary incentive. Instead, they offer convenience to house-
holds by picking up recyclables at the household’s place of residence. It is hypothesized that
if a household starts below some wage threshold, the household will recycle more via the DR
system to supplement its total income.
The second goal of this chapter is to use the private utility maximizing actions of the
household as inputs to the regulator’s social welfare maximizing problem. The regulator
maximizes social welfare by subsidizing each recycling method to account for the fixed stock
of available landfill space. Recycling subsidies come in the forms of either increasing the cash
refund per unit recycled, or by decreasing the per unit time it takes the household to CS
recycle. For the purposes of this chapter, the household receives utility from both methods
of recycling, which can result in the regulator allocating the majority of its budget from
subsidizing one method of recycling to another.
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3.1 Overview
Offering cash refunds to provide an incentive for households to recycle beverage contain-
ers, known as DR systems or bottle bills, is a method currently found in 23 countries and 10
U.S. states to preserve scare resources, reduce energy consumption, and reduce the amount
of waste going to landfills. While U.S. landfill space may not seem to be an issue, landfill
scarcity does arise with the combination of a growing population (EPA, 2013), residents
having a “not in my backyard” mentality, and possible soil and groundwater contamination
- rendering the process of establishing a landfill site quite difficult (Keeler & Renkow, 1994).
To slow depletion of natural resources and landfill sites, DR states have adopted comple-
mentary recycling policies such as CS recycling programs to achieve higher recycling rates
by targeting different demographics of the population. DR systems are generally thought to
target lower income households by offering cash refunds to supplement total household in-
come. CS recycling programs offer a more convenient method of recycling, which is generally
more attractive to higher income households, because the opportunity cost of not supplying
labor is higher for those with higher wages (see footnote 5).
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, how does household recycling behavior
change over time given an exogenous wage growth and no consideration of landfill space?
Second, based on the municipality’s average household wage, solid waste budget, and amount
of landfill space available, should the municipality increase the per unit cash refund the DR
system pays out, or make CS recycling more convenient by reducing the per unit time it
takes to recycle?
DR systems attempt to internalize the marginal social damage of waste disposal by
imposing a per unit consumption tax on beverage containers (Pigou, 1920). However, the
tax is only realized by households who do not return the beverage container via the DR
system. In other words, there is a net zero gain if a household recycles all of its consumption
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via the DR system.14 DR systems have been noted to be better than a Pigouvian tax,
because Pigouvian taxes not only have monitoring and enforcement issues, but tax evasion
is more of a problem with Pigouvian taxes than with DR systems (Walls, 2011).
Additionally, DR systems have been proven both theoretically and empirically to generate
additional benefits, as well as high recycling rates compared to other recycling policies. For
example, states with these systems have been noted to have recycling rates in upwards of 2.5
times more than states without such systems (BEAR, 2002). DR systems are also more cost
effective than other recycling policies (e.g. advance disposal fees and recycling subsidies),
and provide the additional benefit of reducing the incentive for consumers to illegally dump
waste (see Palmer & Walls, 1997; Ashenmiller, 2009; Acuff & Kaffine, 2013). Ashenmiller
(2010) showed that DR systems also provide the benefit of reducing crime rates, because
poor labor market options may increase the incentive for those with such little options to
commit property crime.
Ashenmiller (2009) used surveys to empirically show that lower income households con-
tribute the majority of beverage containers to the DR system. Batson & Eggert (2012) (i.e.
chapter 2) used a panel of 4 U.S. states to illustrate how higher household income results in
higher opportunity costs of recycling, which provides less incentive to make a “special” trip
to a recycling center. They also showed that cash refunds are less effective over time due to
inflation.
Most states with DR systems have yet to increase their cash refunds since their respective
dates of implementation - most being implemented in the 1970s and 1980s.15 Figure 3.1
contains data from 33 counties in California from 2000 to 2008, and shows how the percentage
mix of recycling method changes as household income increases, where household income




and CS share =
1−DRshare. Note that as median household income increases, less is recycled via the DR
14Net zero is strictly in terms of monetary value paid and refunded. This does not account for travel or
opportunity costs.
15California is the only state that has increased its cash refund since its date of implementation, increasing
it three times since 1987 (CRI, 2013).
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Figure 3.1: Recycling Method Shares Over Median Household Income
With DR systems providing an incentive only for a portion of the population, CS recy-
cling programs have been implemented to complement these programs by offering a more
convenient recycling alternative to households in order to achieve high recycling rates. CS re-
cycling programs have gained tremendous popularity over the last two decades, growing from
2,711 programs in 1990 to 9,066 programs in 2012 and serving 71 percent of the population
(CRI, 2013; EPA, 2014). Mrozek (2000) showed that “landfill opportunity costs, mandates
from higher levels of government, citizen preferences for recycling, and transfers of rents
to special interests” increase the probability that a CS recycling program will be adopted.
Additionally, CS recycling programs have a higher probability of being adopted in munici-
palities with regional tipping fees (Kinnaman & Fullerton, 2000). However, it is not to go
16This is not an absolute measure of how DR systems interact with household income, as there may be
spacial and community attitude variations across counties.
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unsaid that while DR systems and CS recycling programs at the aggregate level serve as com-
plementary systems, the two methods do compete for the same goal of increased recycling,
as each method has been thought to overstate their respective benefits by “can”nibalizing
from the alternative recycling method (i.e. recycling beverage containers that would have
been recycled anyway) (see Beatty et al., 2007; Kinnaman & Fullerton, 2000). Furthermore,
Kinnaman (2006) noted that CS recycling programs are not beneficial for all municipalities,
based on the benefits they provide and their associated operating costs.
States with both types of recycling methods implemented have attempted to increase
recycling rates by both increasing cash refunds and access to CS recycling. Increasing cash
refunds will increase recycling quantities in the DR system, but may take beverage containers
away from CS recycling programs by making the “special” trip now economical for households
that were on the margin to recycle for cash. Increasing CS recycling access can in turn do
the opposite by offering a more convenient method of recycling to households that receive
utility from recycling, but previously only had the option of recycling via the DR system.
Studies have determined optimal levels of recycling and landfill rates over time given a
fixed amount of landfill space (see Huhtala, 1997; Highfill & McAsey, 2001), and how recy-
cling technologies impact both the short and long run sustainability of natural resources (see
Hoel, 1978; Andre & Cerda, 2006). More specifically, Highfill & McAsey (2001) showed that
the municipality will initially landfill most of all of its waste generated, because recycling
is considered to be a backstop waste technology. Eventually over time recycling becomes
economical because the shadow price on landfill space grows at the discount rate, and the
municipality’s income increases exogenously over time, allowing it to afford the more expen-
sive waste technology. Andre & Cerda (2004) expanded the fixed amount of landfill space
by developing a model to investigate “the optimal capacity and lifetime of landfills [while]
taking into account their sequential nature.”
Studies have looked more at the dynamics of recycling on resource extraction. Hoel
(1978) examined how recycling can in some cases be considered a substitute to resource
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extraction. He also incorporated the accumulation of harmful residuals (both from extraction
and recycling) to explain that physical depletion is not always optimal, because of these
negative environmental effects. Andre & Cerda (2006) suggest that recycling is only a short
run solution to non-renewable resource depletion due to the possibility of non-decreasing
output paths.
This chapter differs from the previous studies mentioned by disaggregating recycling
quantities into the two methods discussed earlier, and allowing for the regulator to choose
how much of each recycling method to subsidize in order to internalize the scarcity of available
landfill space based on a household’s private optimal choices. It however, does not account
for landfill expansion or recycling’s direct effects on non-renewable resources (e.g. bauxite
mines). This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, the household and regulator
models are introduced using a specific functional form. Next, section 3.3 describes the
methodology used to numerically solve the model. In section 3.4, the simulated model
results are then presented, including various scenarios. Finally, this chapter concludes with
implications for public policy and provides suggestions for future research in section 3.5.
3.2 The Model
The model for this chapter builds on Highfill & McAsey (2001), which showed how
municipalities change their method of disposal over time when income grows exogenously,
and when faced with a fixed amount of landfill space. In contrast to what Highfill & McAsey
(2001) did with their theory of recycling implementation into a municipality, the goal of
this paper is again to identify what mix of recycling methods a household chooses under
exogenously growing wages, either via the DR system or CS recycling program, and present
various scenarios of how the regulator should subsidize each recycling method to account for
a fixed amount of landfill space, given the private optimal actions of the household and its
own exogenously growing budget.
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3.2.1 Household Utility Maximization Problem
Consider a representative household that receives utility from consumption ct, leisure
`t, CS recycling bt, and DR recycling dt. The household is assumed to have a diminishing
marginal utility of recycling, and a non-constant marginal rate of substitution to avoid any
bang-bang solutions that might arise when bt and dt are treated as perfect substitutes. To
allow for flexibility and varying subsistence levels of the choice variables, a constant returns





















1 − α − β − φ
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and σc, σ`, σb, and σd are the respective subsistence levels of
consumption, leisure, CS recycling, and DR recycling.17
Suppose the household earns a total income which is solely spent on consumption ct.
Total household income is derived from both labor income and recycling income. Labor




is the exogenous household wage that grows at some
fixed rate κw, and nt is the level of labor supplied by the household. Recycling income is
θtdt, where θt is the per unit net cash refund received for recycling via the DR system, and
dt is the quantity recycled via the DR system. The per unit net cash refund is the cash
refund less the per unit costs of transporting the waste to a recycling center, which will
henceforth be referred to as cash refund.18 It is assumed θt ≥ 0, as any value less than zero
would simply yield the rational household to not recycle via the DR system. The household’s
budget constraint is
ct = wtnt + θtdt. (3.2)
17For simplicity, it is assumed that all consumption is waste generating. In Highfill & McAsey (2001) this
would be reflected by α = 1. It is also assumed that the household does not incur a per unit cost of
curbside, because volume-based collections are noted to be extremely rare (Jenkins, 1993).
18Batson & Eggert (2012) (i.e. chapter 2) built per unit costs of transportation into the conceptual framework
to reflect how increasing transportation costs affect redemption rates (the quantity recycled via the DR
system divided by the quantity consumed).
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The household is also faced with a time constraint, where time can be spent on recycling,
supplying labor, or leisure activities. Recycling both via the DR system and CS recycling
programs are both assumed to have a linear per unit time cost of cleaning and sorting.
However, recycling via the DR system requires additional time for the household to sort and
return the beverage containers to a recycling center. Therefore, the time to recycle via the
DR system δ is greater than the time to recycle via the CS recycling program γt.
19 The
household’s time constraint is then
h = nt + `t + γtbt + δdt. (3.3)
In reality, households do not consider the landfill size when making the decision to recycle,
which is why a landfill state equation is not included in the household’s utility maximization
problem. Without a known and realized state equation by the household, the representative
household’s utility maximization problem can be solved using a static framework. The
household’s utility maximization problem is
max


















subject to (3.2) and (3.3). With (3.2) holding with equality, one can reduce the household’s
maximization problem to three choice variables by solving for nt from (3.3) and plugging it




+θtdt. This reduces the maximization to solve
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19If the regulator subsidized grocery stores, or other convenient DR recycling centers where the household
would make the trip regardless, then it is possible for δ = γt
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Solving the choice variables through the first order conditions result in the following
optimal household choice variables.
c∗t =σc − ασc + ασdθt − α
(
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θt + σ`wt −
(
− σbγt + h+ . . . (3.8)
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σ` + σdδ + σbγt − h
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n∗t =h− `∗t − γtb∗t − δd∗t (3.9)





































All choice variable movements can either be increasing or decreasing in wt, depending on
the size of the subsistence parameters. Consumption will increase with wages as long as the
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time spent in a given period h exceeds σ` + σdθt + σbγt. A similar formulation holds true
for DR quantities. It is different in the sense that as wages increase, DR quantities are not
dependent on their own subsistence level. These quantities will decrease as long as the time
spent in a given period h exceeds σ` + σbγt. It seems to be more likely that h < σ` + σbγt,
because 0 ≤ `t ≤ h ⇒ 0 ≤ σ` ≤ h and 0 ≤ γt ≤ h, where γt is expected to be closer to its
lower bound. CS recycling and leisure changes with respect to wages depend on σc ≶ σdθt.
If the subsistence level on consumption exceeds the product of the subsistence level on DR
quantities and the cash refund, then both CS recycling quantities and leisure increase in
wages.
This ambiguity goes away when subsistence levels go to zero and the utility function
reduces to a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Note that under this scenario, consumption
is ever increasing with exogenously growing wages and no consideration of landfill space.
Increasing wages result in the opportunity cost of not working to increase, causing the time
spent supplying labor to increase, which directly and positively affects consumption. Since
θt and γt are set by the regulator and exogenous to the household, CS recycling quantities
and leisure are unaffected by wages under this scenario. Provided a constant returns to scale
utility function and h normalized to 1, leisure is solely dependent on its share of utility,
while CS recycling quantities are dependent on the ratio of its share of utility to the per
unit time it takes to CS recycle. Increases to this ratio increase the amount recycled via
the CS recycling program. In other words, there will be more recycling via the CS recycling
program as the household receives more utility from CS recycling relative to the per unit
time it takes to CS recycle.
Furthermore, under the Cobb-Douglas scenario, where CS recycling quantities and leisure
are constant, the household faces a DR recycling-labor tradeoff over time, where ∂d∗t/∂wt < 0
and ∂n∗t/∂wt > 0. This essentially states that households incur an opportunity cost of not
working as time progresses and wages rise. It is also important to note that increasing the
cash refund will yield more to be recycled via the DR system. The next section uses the
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private optimal values from the household as inputs to the regulator’s problem.
3.2.2 Regulator’s Social Welfare Maximization Problem
Now consider a regulator who wishes to maximize social welfare derived from the repre-
sentative household over an infinite-horizon, given a fixed amount of landfill space. Using


























Similar to what the household experiences with wages, the regulator has its own exoge-




, where κg is the fixed rate at which regulator income
grows. It is assumed that regulator income can only be spent on increasing the cash refund
a household receives for recycling via the DR system and/or reducing the time it takes the
household to CS recycle. The cost of subsidizing the DR system is a strict payout to the
households a value of the cash refund θt times the quantity the household recycles via the
DR system d∗t . The cost of subsidizing the CS recycling program is a function where the
regulator incurs more cost by decreasing the per unit time it takes the household to CS re-
cycle. For example, the CS recycling subsidy could come in the form of the regulator taking
on the burden of cleaning and/or sorting the households recyclables.20 More specifically,




Even though there is no saving built into this model, the regulator’s budget is allowed to
be greater than or equal to the amount it spends on subsidizing recycling programs to allow
for flexibility in the numerical solution. The regulator also gains utility from not spending
all of its income at some rate ψ, which can be thought of as a bonus to the solid waste group
20The CS recycling subsidy assumption is similar to what Berglund (2006) examined, where higher income
households, who generally have higher opportunity costs, have a higher willingness to pay to let someone
else sort their waste.
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of the government for promoting recycling and coming under budget at the end of a period.
The regulator provides subsidies based on the household’s optimal private actions, its
own budget, and the initial size of available landfill space. Available landfill space declines
at the rate of consumption less what is recycled.
st+1 = st −
(
c∗t − b∗t − d∗t
)
(3.12)
The state equation, (3.12), is used to solve for γt in terms of θt, all known model parameters
and state transitions. The amount recycled is not to exceed consumption, and the amount
dumped in the landfill cannot exceed the available landfill space.
0 ≤ c∗t − b∗t − d∗t ≤ st (3.13)
Also, a maximum cash refund subsidy θt is imposed to prevent any negative values of
labor or leisure from arising in the numerical solution. For simplicity, assume σb = σd = 0,
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Now only DR recycling and labor are functions of θt. The maximum cash refund subsidy is


























There is also a minimum level on the per unit time CS recycling γt. It is derived from (3.11)
and equal to υ/gt. The same approach can be done for scenarios where the subsistence levels
on CS recycling and DR recycling are non-zero. The assumption made here simply makes
for an easier calculation, and essentially states that households do not have to recycle a
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γt ≤ γt (3.16)







0 ≤ st ≤ s̄. (3.19)
Post-depletion T , the household receives the terminal discounted utility of
∑∞
t=T+1 Φt,
where cT+1 = bT+1+dT+1. In other words, post-depletion, all consumption must be recycled,
either via the CS recycling program, the DR system, or some combination of the two.
The regulator’s problem can thus be characterized by an infinite-horizon recursive Bell-




specifies the maximum present value of household
utility from time period t forward, discounted at the per period factor ρ, and given the














































subject to (3.5) through (3.9), and the terminal condition cT+1 = bT+1 + dT+1. The function
ΦT+1 is interpreted as the terminal discounted utility that households receive post-depletion










where r is the discount rate.21 See Appendix A.1 for the maximization setup and first order
conditions of the post-depletion portion of the model. The first order conditions for the















































































− λ1t = 0 ,







With ρ being the discount factor, it is shown that from (3.23) the shadow price on the









from (3.21) and (3.22). However, this problem cannot be solved analytically unless it is































21Oren & Powell (1985) use this expression to add the discounted utility received when production switches



































Full equations can be viewed in Appendix B.1. As one can see, it is difficult to gain
insights from these Euler equations. Therefore, the model is solved numerically to illustrate
how the share of a regulator’s budget is spent on subsidizing alternative recycling policies
over time.
3.3 Numerical Solution Methodology
Due to the constraints and exogenously growing parameters wt and gt, the analytic solu-
tion, where control variables are functions of the state variables and other model parameters,
is difficult to interpret. Therefore, γt and θt are solved numerically using a backward recur-
sion process over a discretized state space, similar to what Fell et al. (2010) employed. The
steps used to arrive at the numerical solution are as follows.
First, a discretized state space is generated where the time paths of wt and gt are known
and grow at their fixed rates of κw and κg, respectively. Next, the backward recursion
begins by solving for the terminal values of θT provided the landfill state terminal condition




, which in turn calculate all
other choice variables.
This creates a terminal value matrix VT that provides utility values from any possible
state in period T to state values of zero in period T + 1. With the final period’s value
function known, the model is stepped back one period to T − 1 and determine the optimal
γT−1 and θT−1 for each state sT−1. These optimal decisions are then used and added to the
discounted VT to provide values for VT−1. This process is continued until t = 1.
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Through this backward recursion process, the optimal recycling subsidies for each state in
each time period are collected to simulate how the landfill state depletes over time. To begin
the simulation process, it is specified that s = s1. Then using the optimal recycling subsidies
matrix, an optimal landfill state depletion path is formed. The results are presented in the
following section.
3.4 Numerical Solution Results
In this section, the model is simulated using the parameters shown in Table 3.1. The
parameters are then varied to reflect how changes to the model parameters can alter the
landfill depletion path, and the time at which the share of regulator budget switches from
one method of recycling to another.
Table 3.1: Numerical Model Parameters
Parameter Parameter Value Parameter Definitions
α 0.6 Consumption’s share of utility
β 0.39 Leisure’s share of utility
φ 0.005 Curbside recycling’s share of utility
σc 2 Subsistence level on consumption
σ` 0.1 Subsistence level on leisure
σb 0 Subsistence level on curbside quantities
σd 0 Subsistence level on deposit-refund quantities
h 1 Time available in a given period
δ 0.0095 Per unit time to recycle via deposit-refund system
ν 0.03 Cost parameter on curbside recycling
ψ 0.0002 Rate at which excess regulator budget is received
s 50 Initial amount of available landfill space
w0 115 Initial household wage
g0 1000 Initial regulator budget
κw 0.02 Household wage growth rate
κg 0.02 Regulator budget growth rate
ρ 0.91 Discount factor (discount rate r = 0.1)
Figure 3.2, the base case, illustrates both the time paths of available landfill space and
consumption. Landfill depletion occurs as expected given the evolution of marginal utility,
marginal costs, and shadow price of available landfill space under exogenously growing wages.
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In the period just before physical exhaustion, there is a small uptick in the depletion path
which is due to the discretized nature of the state variable. Additionally, consumption follows




























Figure 3.2: Landfill Depletion and Consumption Time Paths
With regards to the shares of regulator spending on DR and CS recycling, it is found
that it can be optimal for a regulator to switch its subsidy focus from DR to CS recycling
as household wages rise and available landfill space falls (see Figure 3.3). It is not always
the case that both regulator spending shares and household recycling shares cross, because
of the expense incurred by the regulator. For example, to keep DR quantities at a constant
rate or the maximum allotted given the time constraint on the household, the regulator
22Consumption rises at rate α of wage when the household utility function collapses to a Cobb-Douglas form.
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must increase the cash refund that households receive at the rate wages grow κw. Otherwise,
the relative value diminishes and households will select the less time consuming recycling
method (i.e. CS recycling) or not to recycle at all, depending on the available landfill space
left in that time period. If the maximum DR quantity is to occur, then the income derived
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Figure 3.3: Recycling and Regulator Spending Shares
Additionally, there is a drop in excess regulator budget post-depletion. This is to be
expected as all that is consumed is to be recycled after landfill space is exhausted. Even
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though consumption has to equal recycling from T + 1 to∞, it does not have to be the case
that gt = θtdt+υ/γt over this time interval. In other words, it can still be that gt > θtdt+υ/γt
over this time interval if the regulator can satisfy the terminal condition without using all
of its budget, such that it continues to receive the additional utility ψ
(
gt − θtdt − υ/γt
)
.
If the regulator receives this additional utility, then there will be a constant rise in excess
budget beyond T +1 due to the exogenous growth rate κg. In the upcoming subsections, it is
explained how parameter changes can affect the landfill depletion times, regulator spending
switching points, and labor-leisure-recycling tradeoffs.
3.4.1 Changes in Initial Regulator Budget
In the scenario where the initial regulator budget is low, but still able to fully subsidize
recycling programs, it is possible to not have physical exhaustion of available landfill space.
This is because the regulator is forced to spend all of its budget on recycling and not receive
additional utility from excess regulator budget. In addition, households end up trading off
time spent working for recycling, where most recycling comes from CS recycling programs,
because the regulator cannot make the cash refund attractive enough to the household to
keep them recycling via the DR system.
With still a low budget but more than just explained, the landfill is depleted quicker
and the regulator will not be able to keep the cash refund as a designated percentage of the
household’s wage (see Figure 3.4). Rather than the cash refund rising at the wage growth
κw until the terminal time, it only does so until the landfill is depleted. The regulator simply
subsidizes as much as it can until it can no longer afford to maintain this policy, resulting




to some new level less than the
maximum.
With this drastic change in DR quantities, CS recycling quantities can take over as the
dominant form of recycling once the landfill is depleted, giving way to a switch in how
the regulator spends its budget. In a moderate regulator income environment relative to
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Figure 3.4: Cash Refund Changes Under Low Initial Regulator Budget
have to use all of its financial means to subsidize recycling. Also, it is possible that in
this situation for the regulator to subsidize as much recycling as it can in the beginning
periods, such that household income is only derived from recycling via the DR system. The
opportunity costs of not working eventually rise enough for the household to switch from
recycling for cash to supplying labor. For this scenario, this will occur once the landfill is
depleted because of the regulator’s low initial budget.
If however, the regulator’s budget is high (relative to the base case), then there will
be minimal changes in the optimal time paths provided the regulator’s budget was already
efficiently allocated to the appropriate methods of recycling. What changes is the discounted
utility. With more budget and no real changes in the time paths, the regulator gets more of
a bonus, yielding higher utility.
3.4.2 Changes in Initial Household Wages
Similar to the scenario where the regulator’s budget is low/moderate relative to household
wages, increases to initial household wages yield an earlier depletion time. The idea is that
as the gap between household wages and regulator budget diminishes, the regulator will
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not have as much income to subsidize the DR system in a manner that is attractive to the
household. Once the landfill is depleted, there can be direct shifts in both the DR and
CS recycling quantities, where DR quantities fall and CS recycling quantities jump and
continue along a specified optimal time path. These shifts may or may not result in changes
in switching points of the regulator’s recycling budget share.
Also with high wages, it may be the case that the regulator subsidizes the CS recycling
program more throughout time, such that initial CS recycling quantities are greater than
DR recycling quantities and continue like this throughout time. In this case, the regulator’s
budget mix may always favor the CS recycling program. In other words, while the DR
system is subsidized, it is just not enough of the budget in the initial periods to enforce
a switching point in the allocation of the regulator’s budget. This is intuitive in that if
you have a municipality with a high mean income, their time is worth more than a poor
municipality, and those that have a high mean income prefer the more convenient method
of recycling (i.e. CS recycling).
Post-depletion, the case is identical to the other scenarios, where more of the recycling
mixture from households comes from the CS recycling program. It is possible to observe
constant levels of DR recycling. This is stemmed from cash refunds keeping pace with the
growth rates of household wages and the regulator’s budget. If θt grew at a rate different
from κw, then changes in DR quantities would occur.
23 At this point, where wages are so
high, the regulator can no longer make it worthwhile for households to recycle via the DR
system. If the regulator has such a large budget that it can afford to keep cash refunds on
par with wages, then it is possible for households to not even work after depletion, since
they can make it so monetarily beneficial for households to recycle via the DR system.
Additionally, given the household’s utility from leisure, it can in fact receive less money
from working if only a certain amount of time can be devoted to labor. Stated otherwise,
23The notion of cash refunds keeping pace with wages or inflation comes from Batson & Eggert (2012) (i.e.
chapter 2). It is specified that in order to keep recycling policies afloat, the regulator must tie the cash
refund to household wages or inflation to keep the relative value at least constant over time.
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if each container is worth a significant amount, then households can make more money re-
cycling than working. Households therefore prefer to not work, but to recycle in order to
maintain increasing consumption. This may result in switching points between recycling
quantities post-depletion, with the same jumps in quantities at the time of depletion. Reg-
ulator spending, however, can then mostly be allocated to subsidizing CS recycling rather
than DR recycling, where no switching point occurs.
3.4.3 Changes in Household Wage Growth
Changes to household wage growth κw can result in exponential or horizontal consump-
tion time paths, depending on the size of the growth rate. As expected, low wage growth
yields a landfill depletion time that is equal to or greater than the base case, while high wage
growth depletes the landfill quicker or the same as the base case. The interesting part is
that there can be a solution where all consumption is recycled in the beginning time periods
before the landfill is depleted. If the regulator’s budget is high enough, then recycling can
be subsidized enough, such that households spend less time recycling while receiving more
money from DR recycling.
With high growth, consumption positively diverges from its base case, whereas low growth
yields a more linear path. This higher growth rate results in a landfill depletion time less
than or equal to the base case. There can be a knife-edge solution, where all is recycled
for some time before the landfill begins to deplete. While households do spend less time
recycling, if the regulator’s budget is high enough, it is able to provide enough cash per
container recycled via the DR system that all can be recycled. Additionally, if the regulator
can put off depleting the resource for the initial few time periods, then it is worthwhile to
conserve the resource since consumption will be higher and landfill space will be depleted
quicker. This yields earlier regulator spending switching points from DR recycling to CS
recycling, which relates back to the high wages. With high wages or high wage growth and
equivalent regulator budget growth, it is optimal to switch from subsidizing DR recycling to
CS recycling earlier, because these households prefer convenience over cash.
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3.4.4 Changes in Curbside Recycling Cost Scalar
Similar to when the regulator’s budget is low/moderate, the landfill is depleted quicker
with all excess regulator budget going to zero when it becomes too costly to subsidize CS
recycling. It is found that switching points do occur in both recycling and regulator budget
shares. The switching point is earlier than in the base case, because now it costs the regulator
more money to subsidize CS recycling (provided the same utility shares).
3.4.5 Changes in Per Unit of Time to Deposit-Refund Recycle
With it being more time consuming to recycle via the DR system, it simply decreases
the level of DR quantities from the base case. Like in the high wage scenario, there can be
scenarios that do not have any switching point in the regulator’s budget share. Now with it
being more difficult to DR recycle and households receiving an equal share of utility from
CS recycling, it may be the case that most regulator spending is allocated to reducing the
time it takes a household to CS recycle. This conclusion becomes even more apparent after
the landfill is depleted. The levels of recycling, however, can have a switching point, because
of the cost structure we have assumed in the model.24
3.4.6 Changes in Utility Shares of Recycling
With equal amounts of utility on DR and CS quantities, but overall higher utility on
recycling than the base case, it is not always the case that the regulator’s spending per-
centages switch. In the instances that they do switch, they switch at a later date, as does
depletion when compared to the base case. In this scenario, DR and CS recycling spending
may increase over time, with CS recycling starting off at a lower level but increasing faster
than DR quantities. Stated differently, the percent of the regulator’s budget spent on CS
recycling increases at a decreasing rate, while the percent spent on DR recycling decreases
at a decreasing rate.
24A way to get around this perplexity is to choose δ, and allow for an unlimited amount of cans to be
returned to a recycling center that would have been made regardless (see footnote 6).
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If CS recycling has more utility share than DR recycling, regulator spending shares switch
at an earlier date, because of the relative cost of CS recycling (i.e. it is more expensive,
because the regulator seeks to decrease γt more than the base case). This results in θt having
to be a little higher to keep DR recycling at its maximum in order to make it worthwhile
for households to continue to recycle via the DR system. Since households get more utility
from CS recycling, the regulator must make it monetarily better to get households to go to
a DR recycling center. As with higher but equal recycling utility shares, landfill space is not
depleted as quickly as compared to the base case.
3.4.7 Changes in Benefit Received from Excess Regulator Budget
With a greater benefit payout from not spending all regulator budget, the landfill is
depleted quicker. This would be the scenario where the regulator would like to have the
added utility post-depletion now for not spending all of its budget. However, this hurts the
regulator in the future, because it gets less additional utility later as it is forced to do all
recycling at an earlier time. Post-depletion, recycling quantities are the same in this case as
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Figure 3.5: Total Recycling Changes Under High Benefit from Excess Regulator Budget
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3.4.8 Changes in Discount Rate
As theory states, the discount rate has a negative impact on the time of which the resource
is depleted. With higher discount rates (lower discount factors), this model confirms the
theory by depleting the landfill in an earlier period. The lower the discount rate, future time
periods hold more value and thus landfill depletion occurs at a later time. Due to the nature
of the model, changes to the discount rate do not have any impact on the consumption time
path. The long run path is the same for CS recycling quantities regardless of the discount
rate. It simply depends on when the jump in CS recycling quantities occur (earlier for high
discount rates). Additionally, there is no impact on DR recycling quantities. The interesting
fact is that for higher discount rates, the switching point of the regulator’s budget share
happens later than in the base case. This is because with high discount rates, the landfill is
depleted quicker, yielding an earlier jump/drop in CS/DR recycling shares.
3.4.9 Changes in Subsistence Levels
With high subsistence levels for consumption, it is apparent that consumption levels will
shift up to meet the new subsistence level. This higher subsistence level results in an earlier
depletion and an earlier jump in CS recycling quantities. DR recycling quantities have more
of a bow in the levels, with the overall quantities declining over time.
With higher subsistence levels on leisure, a tradeoff between consumption and leisure
really becomes prominent. Like the higher subsistence level on consumption, a higher sub-
sistence level on leisure results in an earlier depletion time than the base case. The share
of regulator spending on CS recycling is initially lower, because households prefer leisure to
working or recycling. In the long run, there is not effect on θt or γt.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examined how a regulator of a municipality or state should subsidize its
recycling programs based on the actions of the private utility maximizing household. While
previous studies either assumed one type of recycling program or no recycling-labor tradeoff,
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this chapter accounted for how households act in reality - no consideration of landfill space.
Under this assumption and the assumption that household wage grows exogenously, similar
results to Ashenmiller (2009) are found, where lower income households use the DR system
as a substantial source of income. It is then showed that based on the regulator’s budget,
DR recycling can only be subsidized for a period of time due to it becoming too costly for the
regulator to continue making DR cash refunds attractive enough to a now more wealthier
household. In the long run, it was shown that subsidizing CS recycling programs is the
solution to a depleted landfill.
Future research is to calibrate this model to an actual municipality. It would also be
beneficial to policymakers if this model were expanded to allow for multiple landfill sites




OPTIMAL WASTE-TO-ENERGY INVESTMENTS IN THE PRESENCE OF
RECYCLING PROGRAMS AND GROWING HOUSEHOLD WAGES
Co-author: Harrison G. Fell
This chapter constructs a theoretical model that combines elements of Batson et al.
(2013) (i.e. chapter 3) with investments in WTE technologies. Simulation results indicate
that optimal investments in such technologies should occur at a point when the net benefits
of investment exceed the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits received from recycling. This
concept is then related to the current debates surrounding this topic, such as the promotion
of consumption and the demotion of recycling policies.
4.1 Overview
Energy recovery from waste, or WTE, is a process that includes incinerating non-recyclable
waste material from landfills to generate an alternative form of energy. WTE plants either
take the initiative of removing recyclables at a receiving area, or rely on municipal recycling
programs to perform a “first-pass” of solid waste sorting before proceeding to the shredders
and furnaces. In either case, WTE plants remove recyclable material from the system to
ensure that no “can”nibalization of waste is occurring. In other words, WTE plants are not
to benefit from the incineration of materials that should have not been in their system ini-
tially. Investment in such plants offer benefits of reducing the use of landfills and generating
“cleaner” emitting energy.25
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework that will assist poli-
cymakers in determining whether or not to convert waste into energy through an optimal
25This is noted to be “cleaner”, because incineration does generate greenhouse gas and acid rain emissions,
as well as residuals and dioxins (Vollebergh, 1997).
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investment strategy, given the actions of a representative household that experiences exoge-
nously growing wages and an available recycling method. It probes the question, at what
times is it appropriate to invest in WTE technologies and how do these investments impact
a municipality’s recycling rates and social welfare over time, provided their added associated
net benefits and a fixed amount of landfill space?
While WTE plants have the benefit of slowing down landfill depletion and generating
“cleaner” energy, not all are in favor of such an investment. Those who oppose promoting
these plants argue that they have negative effects on municipal recycling programs, promote
additional consumption, and that selecting an incinerator site is a difficult process (Rosen-
thal, 2010). However, studies have shown that states with WTE plants do not demote recy-
cling programs or reduce recycling rates. In fact, “communities using WTE have recycling
rates that are five percentage points or more above the national average” (Berenyi, 2009).
Those who have argued the point of promoting consumption make a valid observation. For
a WTE investment to make economic sense, there has to be enough waste material supplied
to justify building a plant that reduces carbon emissions and slows down landfill depletion.
To counter this point, population growth and economic growth are thought to be growing
faster than society is moving towards a zero-waste world (Cheng et al., 2007). Lastly, and
not unlike the landfill story, selecting a site for an incinerator or landfill is difficult, because
households have a “not in my backyard” mentality.
Studies carried out have yet to capture the investment decision in such technologies.
Keeler & Renkow (1994) however, developed a static model to show the effects WTE tech-
nologies have on a municipality’s waste disposal efficiency. The regulator seeks to minimize
costs by determining the capacity of a WTE plant, and by determining recycling, landfill,
and incineration quantities. They find that higher fixed costs of WTE plants and higher re-
cycled quantities render a WTE plant less attractive, while higher levels of waste and higher
landfill costs make the plant more attractive.
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Other studies have confirmed such claims. For example, Dijkgraaf & Vollebergh (2004)
explained that yes, WTE plants have high gross private costs and are “a very expensive way
to save on climate change emissions”, but they can be preferred over landfilling when only
environmental costs are considered.26 Vollebergh (1997) stated that these private costs may
be offset or at least the net private costs may be lowered with electricity sales. As for higher
landfill costs, investments in such technologies have been noted to be more successful where
land is scarce (Kinnaman & Fullerton, 1999). With land being scarce, landfill costs increase,
resulting in the adoption of WTE plants becoming more economical. This is in part why
Japan, parts of Europe, and the northeast region of the U.S. have adopted such mechanisms
since the 1970s (Kinnaman & Fullerton, 1999).
As mentioned in Batson et al. (2013) (i.e. chapter 3), theoretical studies have used dy-
namic models to incorporate a fixed amount of landfill space. Specifically, Highfill & McAsey
(2001) used a dynamic model to show that municipalities with higher income will have high
levels of recycling, because recycling is considered to be a backstop waste technology. This
is similar to what Viscusi et al. (2013) uncovered in their survey. They found that munic-
ipalities with higher income households, which generally have higher property taxes, allow
for those municipalities to have “more access to recycling options that minimize opportunity
costs.”
Additionally, Highfill & McAsey (2001) established that lower income municipalities
should rely less on recycling, exhausting landfill space if it is small. As shown in Batson
et al. (2013) (i.e. chapter 3), exhaustion is an outcome, but it is possible to have recycling
in earlier periods given a DR system. Furthermore, Huhtala (1997) used a dynamic model
with fixed landfill space to “account for the physical costs of recycling, the social costs of
landfilling, and consumers’ environmental preferences.” She then used the model to simulate
26Villanueva & Wenzel (2007) conducted a life cycle assessment that showed it is better to recycle paper than
landfill or incinerate it based on the environmental impact categories: energy use/generation, abiotic and
biotic resource consumption, energy related impacts (e.g. global warming potential, acidification potential,
nutrient enrichment potential, and photochemical ozone formation potential), toxicity of emissions, waste
generation, and wastewater generation.
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an optimal waste management plan with the assumption that recycling technology and costs
are relatively constant over time.
The model presented in this chapter is at the forefront of economic research pertaining to
the combination of recycling policies and WTE investments. In contrast to Huhtala (1997),
this study allows for changes in waste management technologies via a WTE investment
opportunity. It reflects how recycling policies and WTE investments can work in conjunction
to offset consumption and consequently landfill space depletion. The results indicate that
policymakers can use the theory illustrated in this paper to justify an investment in WTE
technologies under various scenarios. The justification of an investment is highly dependent
on the response of household behavior to recycling policy changes, and the net benefits
received from the investment. The latter is not too surprising in that an investment should
occur if the marginal net benefits are positive. The intriguing aspect of this chapter is that
the investment is to occur not only if the net benefits are positive, but if these net benefits
outweigh the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits received by the household from recycling,
and some bonus benefit that is received by the regulator for being below budget.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, section 4.2 formulates household and regulator
models using a specific functional form. Next, section 4.3 explains the methodology used to
solve the model. The model results are then presented, including various scenarios in section
4.4. Section 4.5 provides insight to how policy makers can use these findings to determine if
a WTE investment is economical, and what effects such an investment will have on recycling
rates. Finally, section 4.6 concludes this chapter and provides suggestions for future research.
4.2 The Model
The model for this chapter builds on the fundamental framework formulated in Batson
et al. (2013) (i.e. chapter 3). This model simplifies that model to consider the recycling
decisions of a representative private utility maximizing household based on an available DR
system (i.e. no CS recycling program will be considered in this chapter). Under a DR system,
household decisions are based on a cash refund supplied by the regulator. In addition to
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subsidizing recycling, the regulator has the binary decision to invest or not to invest in
WTE technologies in order to alter the landfill space depletion path. This decision takes
into account net benefits received from selling the “cleaner” energy, the fixed cost of the
investment, and the variable costs of operating and maintaining the investment.
Again, the goal of this paper is to reflect when it is economically justifiable to invest in
WTE technologies, and how this investment will impact recycling rates and social welfare.
The remainder of this section is broken into two subsections. The first subsection will present
the household’s utility maximization problem given a DR system available. The second
subsection will then use the outputs from the household’s utility maximization problem as
inputs to the regulator’s social welfare maximization problem.
4.2.1 Household Utility Maximization Problem
Consider a representative household that receives utility from consumption ct, leisure `t,
and DR recycling dt. The household is assumed to have a diminishing marginal utility of
recycling, and a non-constant marginal rate of substitution to avoid any bang-bang solutions.
Like in Batson et al. (2013) (i.e. chapter 3), a constant returns to scale Stone-Geary utility
function is employed to allow for flexibility and varying subsistence levels in the choice
















where σc, σ`, and σd are the respective subsistence levels of consumption, leisure, and DR
recycling. The household’s budget constraint is
ct = wtnt + θtdt. (4.2)
The household earns income from labor nt and recycling dt, which is solely spent on
consumption ct. Earned labor income is derived from exogenously growing wages, which
rise at some fixed rate κw, and follow the compounded growth function wt = w0 (1 + κw)
t.
Earned recycling income is derived from the per unit net cash refund θt households receive
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for recycling via the DR system.27 It is assumed θt ≥ 0, as any value less than zero would
simply indicate that the household would be willing to take a monetary loss in order to
recycle.
The household is also faced with a time constraint, where time can be spent on recy-
cling dt, supplying labor nt, or leisure activities `t. Like in the previous chapter, the time
associated with recycling via the DR system is assumed to be a linear per unit time cost,
which encompasses the time it takes to clean, sort, store, and return a beverage container
to a recycling center. Therefore, the household’s time constraint is
h = nt + `t + δdt, (4.3)
where h is the time available in a period and δ is the per unit time cost associated with
recycling via the DR recycling system.
As assumed in Batson et al. (2013) (i.e. chapter 3), households in reality do not consider
landfill space when making the decision to recycle. Therefore, no landfill state equation is
formulated in the household’s utility maximization problem. Without a known and realized
state equation by the household, the representative household’s utility maximization can be


















subject to (4.2) and (4.3). Provided both constraints hold with equality, the household’s
maximization problem can be reduced to two choice variables by solving for labor nt from

















σc − dtθt + dtδwt − hwt + `twt




27Recall from chapter 3 that the per unit net cash refund is the cash refund received less the per unit costs
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Solving the choice variables through the first order conditions and plugging the optimal
solutions into the constraints yield the following optimal household choice variables.
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Most choice variable movements can either be increasing or decreasing in wt, depending
on the size of the subsistence parameters. Consumption is most likely increasing in wages,
because both σ` and δσd are bound between 0 and h from (4.3). Leisure on the other hand,
can be increasing or decreasing in wages, depending if σc ≷ σdθt. It is known that σc > σd,
therefore the way leisure changes as wages increase depends on how much the regulator
subsidizes DR recycling. If the regulator subsidizes DR recycling by more than σc/σd, then
the representative household will decrease the amount of time in a period it dedicates to
leisure activities.
For DR quantities, the change per period with increasing wages depends on the inequality
δσc ≷ (−h+ σ`) θt. DR quantities will increase with wages provided δσc>(−h+ σ`) θt. As
for labor amounts, it is very ambiguous on whether or not labor is increasing or decreasing in
wages. Therefore, to take away the ambiguity of these comparative “statics”, it is assumed
that all subsistence levels are zero and the utility function reduces to a Cobb-Douglas utility
function.
Under this simplicity assumption it is clear that consumption increases definitively. It also
simplifies the problem such that leisure is independent of wages. DR quantities are decreasing
in wages, which is similar to what Ashenmiller (2009) alluded to with her empirical research
on recycling centers. Labor increases in wages due to the increasing opportunity costs of not
working (i.e. it becomes more costly not to work as wages grow over time).
4.2.2 Regulator’s Social Welfare Maximization Problem
Now consider a regulator who wishes to maximize the welfare derived by the representa-
tive household over an infinite-time horizon, given a fixed stock of available landfill space, and
under an available DR system. Using (4.5) to (4.8), the utility Ut enjoyed by the household






































Similar to what the household experiences with wages, the regulator has its own ex-




, where κg is the fixed rate at which regulator
income grows. The regulator may supplement its income if it invests in WTE technologies
with the per unit price Pp for selling the “cleaner” power. The term zt simply refers to
material not consumed or recycled. Of this available material π, bound between 0 and 1,




thus goes to an incinerator for “cleaner” power
generation since this additional income is only captured by the regulator if an investment
has occurred.28 Mathematically, D1t = 0 if no investment was made in period t or any prior
period. Otherwise, D1t = 1, rendering the investment irreversible.
Total regulator income can be spent on increasing the cash refund θt a household receives





operate and maintain the WTE investment, where ω is the coefficient on the power generation
costs. Additionally, η is the fixed investment cost that is only made in the period the
investment is initiated. Therefore, D2t = 1 if and only if the investment was made in period
t. Otherwise, D2t = 0. Any excess regulator budget is received at rate ψ, which contributes
to utility and is thought of as a bonus to the solid waste management group for promoting
recycling and “cleaner” power generation while not spending all of its budget. The regulator
provides the recycling subsidy to households and invests in WTE technologies based on the
household’s optimal private actions, its own budget (both the exogenously growing portion
and what is received from “cleaner” power generation), the cost incurred for investing in
WTE technologies, and the initial size of available landfill space. Landfill space declines as
28This assumption accounts for the fact that WTE plants are not to benefit from the incineration of materials
that should not have been in their system initially (e.g. beverage containers).
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follows.
st+1 = st −
(







Under no investment (i.e. D1t = D2t = 0), available landfill space declines at the rate of
consumption less what is recycled. Under investment, however, landfill space declines at the
rate consumption less recycled material, and less any discarded material that is burned for
“cleaner” power generation.
A maximum cash refund subsidy θt is imposed to prevent the regulator’s budget con-
straint from being violated in the numerical solution. For simplicity, assume σd = 0. The












































































0 ≤ st ≤ s̄. (4.15)
Post-depletion T , the household receives the terminal discounted utility of
∑∞
t=T+1 Φt, where




zT+1. In other words, all consumption must be either recycled,
burned for power generation, or some combination of the two once the landfill is depleted.
The regulator’s problem can thus characterized by an infinite-horizon recursive Bellman




specifies the maximum net present value of household
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utility from period t forward, discounted at the per period factor ρ, and given the amount
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, where r is the discount rate (see footnote 21). Appendix A.2
formulates the maximization setup and first order conditions of the post-depletion portion



























































With the discount factor ρ, (4.19) reflects that the shadow price on the landfill state rises








are derived from (4.17)
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and (4.18). However, this problem cannot be solved analytically unless it is assumed that
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θt+1, wt+1, λ1,t+1, wt, λ1t
))
zt =
Pp − Ppρ+ ωρzt+1
ω
(4.23)
Full equations can be viewed in Appendix B.2. As one can see, it is difficult to gain
insights from the first Euler equation. As for zt, its evolution along the optimal path is
solely dependent on the per unit price the regulator receives from selling WTE power Pp,
and the power generation cost coefficient ω. However from (4.21), zt is dependent on how
much recycling occurs dt, which is determined by the size of the cash refund θt. Therefore,
the model is solved numerically to illustrate how the investment in WTE technologies and
landfill depletion occurs over time.
4.3 Numerical Solution Methodology
Due to the constraints and exogenously growing parameters wt and gt, the analytic
solution, where control variables are functions of continuous state variables and other model
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parameters, is difficult to interpret. Therefore, θt and zt are solved numerically using a
backward recursion process over a discretized state space, a similar method to what Fell
et al. (2010) and Batson et al. (2013) (i.e. chapter 3) employed.
In both cases, a discretized state space of dimensions s by s is first generated where
the time paths of wt and gt are known and grow at the fixed rates κw and κg, respectively.
Next, two investment matrices of D1t and D2t are generated, expanding the feasible matrix
dimensions to 2s by 2s. These state and investment matrices are then used to generate a
landfill depletion rate matrix by solving for the terminal values of θT provided the landfill




zT+1. These values are in turn used
to calculate all other choice variables.
All choice variables then feed into our generated terminal value matrix VT , which provides
utility values from any possible state in period T to state values of zero in period T + 1.
With the final period’s value function known, the model is stepped back one period to T − 1
and determine the optimal θT−1 for each state sT−1. These optimal decisions are added to
the discounted VT to provide values for VT−1. The process in continued until t = 1.
Through this backward recursion process, optimal recycling subsidies for each state,
recycling case, and investment case in each time period to simulate landfill state depletion
over time are collected. The simulation process begins with s̄ = s1. Then using the optimal
recycling subsidy matrix, an optimal state depletion path is formed. It uses the thought that
investment is irreversible. Once the investment is made, then there is no going back to the
non-investment strategy depletion path. The results for each recycling case are presented in
the following section.
4.4 Numerical Solution Results
In this section, the model is simulated with non-calibrated parameters. The parameters
are then varied to reflect how changes to the model parameters can alter the time of in-
vestment in WTE technologies. The model was simulated using the parameters shown in
Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Numerical Model Parameters - Investment Model
Parameter Parameter Value Parameter Definitions
α 0.7 Consumption’s share of utility
β 0.25 Leisure’s share of utility
σc 50 Subsistence level on consumption
σ` 0.1 Subsistence level on leisure
σd 0 Subsistence level on deposit-refund quantities
h 1 Time available in a given period
δ 0.001 Per unit time to recycle via deposit-refund system
ψ 0.001 Rate at which excess regulator budget is received
s 50 Initial amount of available landfill space
w0 70 Initial household wage
g0 1000 Initial regulator budget
κw 0.021 Household wage growth rate
κg 0.021 Regulator budget growth rate
π 0.15 Landfill space decline rate under investment
Pp 5 Per unit benefit from WTE power generation
η 1.5 Fixed cost of investment
ω .25 Variable cost coefficient on WTE power generation
ρ 0.91 Discount factor (discount rate r = 0.1)
Figure 4.1, the base case, illustrates the time paths of available landfill space, investment
in WTE technologies, and consumption. Consumption follows the presumed time path
under exogenously growing wages, as shown in subsection 4.2.1. Landfill depletion occurs
as expected post-investment, reflecting a similar curve to that illustrated in the previous
chapter. It depletes in a concave manner based on the evolution of marginal utility, marginal
costs, and the shadow price on landfill space.
Figure 4.1 reflects a drop in available landfill space from the initial period to the time
of investment. This is attributed to the fixed cost of investment, as well as the variable
costs associated with operating and maintaining the investment. The more the costly the
investment, the less excess regulator budget is available, thus reducing the amount of avail-
able budget to subsidize recycling. With this lack of funding for recycling, less recycling is
performed by the household. In terms of shares of regulator spending, before investment,


































Figure 4.1: Landfill Depletion and Consumption Time Paths Under Investment
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(see Figure 4.2). In the period of investment, there is a sharp change in regulator spending,
where the percent of spending on recycling goes from 100 percent (i.e. no funds spent on



















Figure 4.2: Power Generation and Recycling Quantities
Less time spent recycling allows the household to supply more labor and devote more
time to leisure activities. While Figure 4.3 shows a decline over time in the household’s time
allocated to supplying labor, it is higher than if no investment were to occur. It declines due
to increasing wages, which require less labor to maintain the presumed consumption time
path. Declining labor thus allows more time for the household to dedicate towards leisure
and recycle activities, but at decreasing rates.
In scenarios where initial wages w0 are lower relative to the base case, investment generally
occurs in a later period. This is because the regulator’s budget is sufficient enough to fully
subsidize recycling based on the low household wages. With the recycling subsidy able
to offset landfill space depletion, it is possible that no investment in WTE is required to
supplement the recycling policy. If however, the regulator has a large budget initially g0,





















Figure 4.3: Labor, Leisure, and Recycling Shares
then it is possible that there will not be any change in the time of investment. If the
regulator’s budget is at an efficient allocation based on the given fixed cost η, the variable




z2t /2, and the price received for “cleaner” power generation Pp,
then investment cannot occur any earlier or later than the base case. In other words, there
is a threshold where it does not matter how much regulator budget is available, because
there will be an optimal time of investment due to the shadow price on landfill space and an
efficient allocation of regulator spending. The difference is in discounted utility, which will
be higher in these cases compared to the base case. Contrastingly, in extremely low regulator
budget scenarios, it is possible for the investment to never take place, as there simply is not
enough funding to justify the investment.
Results may vary in scenarios where growth rates of wages κw and regulator budget κg are
altered and unequal. When κw > κg, results can either be unchanged or yield a later time of
investment relative to the base case. This depends on how much exogenous regulator budget
is initially available. If the regulator has enough exogenous budget to subsidize recycling for
some time, invariant to the rate at which wages rise, then it is possible for the regulator to
fully subsidize recycling for a longer period of time. Similarly when κw < κg, it is possible
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for an earlier investment time where the regulator can capture the added benefits from the
WTE investment earlier since its budget rises faster than wages. This excess budget can
be chosen to accumulate at rate ψ, or be invested in WTE technologies to receive rate Pp
from “cleaner” energy generation while paying out the fixed cost and the variable costs of
operating and maintaining the investment.
The results pertaining to the financial aspects of WTE investments are not surprising.
Higher per unit prices received from generating WTE power Pp yield an earlier investment
time. Additionally, a higher fixed cost η and a higher coefficient on the variable costs of
generation ω push out the time of investment. In certain parameter combinations, it may
be optimal for the regulator to not invest in WTE technologies, depending on the costs of
opening, operating, and maintaining the investment.
4.5 Implications for Public Policy
From the previous section, it was shown that a recycling policy, such as a DR system,
combined with an investment opportunity in WTE technologies can work together to achieve
the same goal of slowing landfill space depletion. One of the major concerns with the
WTE technology concept is that it is said to promote consumption to make the investment
economically justifiable. This model showed that even under exogenously growing wages and
consequently growing consumption, recycling policies and WTE investments can be used as
complements to offset consumption and ultimately landfill space deletion. Yet what does
this mean for policymakers in terms of recycling rates and social welfare under communities
faced with restricted landfill space?
It means that policymakers should look to incorporate WTE technologies with recycling
policies, provided the goal is to slow landfill depletion and maximize social welfare by supple-
menting municipality income. The investment should be made if the net monetary benefits
received from “cleaner” power generation are sufficient enough to outweigh the monetary
benefits households receive when the regulator subsidizes recycling, and the “warm glow” ef-

















Figure 4.4: Cash Refunds - Base Case and Maximum Case
allow for a policymaker to not have to maintain the cash refund as much (see Figure 4.4). A
policymaker can instead utilize its funds to invest in WTE technologies, which provide the
added benefit of “cleaner” power generation as well as a pecuniary benefit. This of course
has a negative impact on recycling rates (see Figure 4.5). Using the excess budget to invest
in WTE technologies yields lower recycling rates than otherwise would have been if all regu-
lator budget was used to subsidize recycling. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the two













Figure 4.5: Recycling Rates from Base Case
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The pecuniary benefit received from selling the power generated by the WTE investment
can be used by a policymaker to supplement its income. In theory, the more income a
municipality has, the less it requires income from sources such as city/state taxes paid by
households. The model in this chapter assumes that the cost of power to the household
is embedded in consumption. Therefore, it would be appropriate to look into alternative
power generation means to observe when investment in this backstop power technology
should occur. The added income from selling WTE power as a percentage of the regulator’s













Figure 4.6: Percent Additions of Power Generation to Regulator Budget from Base Case
As regulator budget g0 increases, the supplemental income from power generation will
yield somewhat of a convex function based on the allowable amount of incineration of waste.
Again, this model does not account for fuel switching, but it does provide insight to potential





Using this percentage, the model can provide policymakers with the fundamentals that will
help determine whether or not the investment is economically feasible given its associated
prices and costs. If the current costs of maintaining such a plant are high relative to the
potential revenues generated, where the cost is more than a substitutable power source, then
no investment might be socially optimal. This is a concept that all policymakers are familiar
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with. However, policymakers are to ensure that these net benefits outweigh the “warm glow”
households receive from recycling plus the pecuniary benefit they receive from recycling via
the DR system. In a low income municipality, the pecuniary benefits from recycling might be
a large portion of the household’s total income. Therefore, an optimal investment strategy
could in fact be not to invest in WTE technologies.
The decision to invest is also dependent on how much landfill space is available. With
small landfill sizes, the initial shadow price on landfill space is higher than in scenarios with
large landfill sizes. In order to make the more constrained landfill spaces economical, due
to the shadow price, either the price at which “cleaner” energy is sold must increase or the
operating and maintenance costs must decrease. Again, this model does not account for
substitution of power generation. Therefore, price changes have no effect on the type of
power generated and sold.
Lastly, and as more of a side-note, suppose costs of operating and maintaining the in-
vestment decrease over time, similar to what a learning curve would yield.30 Knowing that
costs will decrease and prices will remain constant (i.e. more net benefit over time) yields an
earlier time of investment such that these increasing net benefits are captured in subsequent
periods (see Figure 4.7). In other words, this could be thought of as an initial subsidy to an
infant industry, where the subsidy helps WTE technologies become cost competitive with
other power sources such as coal, oil, and natural gas.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examined how a regulator of a municipality or state should subsidize recy-
cling and/or invest in WTE technologies based on the actions of a private utility maximizing
household. Previous arguments have stated that investment in WTE technologies and recy-
cling can have counterproductive efforts, while other say they can work together. Under the
30This simulation does not fully account for any of the complexities that infant industry arguments or
learning curves truly have on WTE investments. It simply shows that given the expectation that costs




























Figure 4.7: Decreasing Cost of Operating and Maintaining the Investment
assumptions of this model, an investment in WTE technologies may have a negative impact
on municipal recycling programs. The two, however, work together to achieve an optimal
depletion path that maximizes social welfare. Like all investments, early investment and no
investment scenarios depend on the incurred costs and received benefits of the investment.
This chapter also confirmed that WTE investments do require a certain level of consumption
to be performed to make the technology investment economical relative to their fixed capital
costs and variable costs of operating and maintaining the investment.
Future research would be to expand this foundational study to incorporate sorting at
WTE plants, such that investments in technologies can promote recycling. Other possible
areas for future research would be to allow for an alternative power generation source (e.g.
non-renewables). With WTE technologies being both a backstop waste technology and
backstop means of power generation, it would be advantageous to include the infant industry
argument with a learning curve to get WTE technologies cost competitive with alternative
sources. Lastly, it might be worthwhile to use this model as a foundation for a double-
dividend study. A society could receive benefits from the “cleaner” energy source, while
the regulator receives monetary benefits from selling the power or taxing the non-renewable




Recycling policies have traditionally been analyzed using either survey-based or theoretic
methodologies. While the research presented in this dissertation does contain theoretic meth-
ods, it provides a new perspective on how policies and investments in waste reduction affect
a household’s decision to recycle and by which method over time. By impacting the behav-
ioral element, a municipality can fully realize the total social benefits provided by recycling
and waste-to-energy technologies (e.g. reducing the waste going to landfills and emitting
“cleaner” emissions through alternative power generation methods). The recommendations
emphasized in this dissertation can provide policymakers with a general framework of how
to think about waste management over time.
Chapter 2 provided empirical backing to previous literature that cash refunds positively
influence recycling and redemption rates. It also estimated the opportunity cost of recycling
to be equivalent to per capita personal income in order to hone in on the declining beverage
container recycling and redemption rate time periods. Furthermore, this chapter explained
how simply adjusting the cash refund for inflation, or for income changes, can alter a house-
hold’s decision to recycle via the deposit-refund system; allowing a municipality to better
internalize the potential benefits to be gained from recycling.
Next, chapter 3 simultaneously evaluated two mainstream recycling policies to suggest
how a regulator should allocate its budget over time as wages rise (similar to the inflation
explanation of chapter 2) and given a fixed amount of landfill space. It theoretically proved
that optimal recycling policies should consider a municipality’s economic demographics and
available landfill space. Under various conditions, it was shown that a municipality should
subsidize the deposit-refund system provided wages are less than some threshold, and change
its mix of subsidy over time as wages rise. The change in mix occurred for two reasons, the
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regulator was unable to keep pace with inflation or rising wages to make the cash refund
worthwhile to the household, and the household prefers convenience over cash as wages rise
due to the increasing opportunity costs of not working.
Finally, chapter 4 provided suggestions for when an investment in waste-to-energy tech-
nologies should be carried out given increases to household wages, a fixed amount of landfill
space, and an available recycling policy. Under a designated regulator budget, this chapter
theoretically favored the argument that recycling and investment in waste-to-energy tech-
nologies have opposing forces in terms of recycling rates. It however, did not account for the
potential of these technologies to sort out recyclable material. This resulted in investments
beyond a point where the net benefits from the waste-to-energy investment exceed the pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary benefits received from recycling. During the time of investment,
financial resources are taken away from subsidy capital that could be allocated to maintain-
ing recycling policies. Furthermore, it is shown that for these investments to be economical,
there must be a certain amount of non-recycled consumption material to justify the costs
associated with building, operating, and maintaining a WTE plant.
This thesis not only contributes to waste management policy design, but offers compu-
tational and empirical methods that have yet to be fully developed in the environmental
economics literature. Simply implementing a recycling policy will essentially not allow for
realization of the full potential these policies have to offer given the externalities of landfill
scarcity and greenhouse gas emissions. To capture the full benefits, the regulator of a munic-
ipality must adjust the policies over time to account for inflation and rising wages. Lastly,
this thesis provides the framework and model for calibration to a specific municipality, and
allows for further exploration on the waste-to-energy investment front.
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APPENDIX A - ADDITIONAL FORMULATIONS
A.1 Additional Formulations for Chapter 3
The post-depletion problem and first order conditions are proved below with the addi-
tional assumption σc = σ` = 0. Recall that this problem is the sum of all utility when st = 0
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A.2 Additional Formulations for Chapter 4
The post-depletion problem and first order conditions are proved below with the addi-
tional assumption σc = σ` = 0. Recall that this problem is the sum of all utility when
st = 0 and all that is consumed must be recycled, burned for power generation, or some
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APPENDIX B - ADDITIONAL EQUATIONS
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B.2 Additional Equations for Chapter 4
χ =
√
−1 + α + β
√
−1 + α + β − 4λ1tψ
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σc − hwt + σ`wt
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APPENDIX C - CODE
C.1 Code for Chapter 2 Using Regression Analysis of Time Series (RATS)
∗Checking to make sure a l l was imported c o r r e c t l y
p r i n t / r e d r a t e cash re fund sc members pcpi g a s p r i c e
∗Calcu la te S i e r r a Club Members as percent o f the populat ion
s e t sc pop = sc members/ populat ion ∗100
∗Rebasing d o l l a r terms in to 2010 USD
s e t r e a l c a s h r e f u n d = cash re fund / cpi2010
s e t r e a l p c p i = pcpi / cpi2010
s e t r e a l g a s p r i c e = g a s p r i c e / cpi2010
∗Logging the data
s e t l r e d r a t e = log ( r e d r a t e )
s e t l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d = log ( r e a l c a s h r e f u n d )
s e t l s c p o p = log ( sc pop )
s e t l r e a l p c p i = log ( r e a l p c p i )
s e t l r e a l g a s p r i c e = log ( r e a l g a s p r i c e )
∗D i f f e r e n c i n g the data
s e t d l r e d r a t e = l r e d r a t e − l r e d r a t e {1}
s e t d l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d = l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d − l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d {1}
s e t d l s c pop = l s c p o p − l s c p o p {1}
s e t d l r e a l p c p i = l r e a l p c p i − l r e a l p c p i {1}
s e t d l r e a l g a s p r i c e = l r e a l g a s p r i c e − l r e a l g a s p r i c e {1}
∗D e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s in l e v e l s
s t a t i s t i c s r e d r a t e
s t a t i s t i c s r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
s t a t i s t i c s r e a l p c p i
s t a t i s t i c s r e a l g a s p r i c e
s t a t i s t i c s sc pop
t a b l e / r e d r a t e r e a l c a s h r e f u n d r e a l p c p i r e a l g a s p r i c e sc pop
∗D e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s in l o g s
s t a t i s t i c s l r e d r a t e
s t a t i s t i c s l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
s t a t i s t i c s l r e a l p c p i
s t a t i s t i c s l r e a l g a s p r i c e
s t a t i s t i c s l s c p o p
t a b l e / l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e l s c p o p
∗Im , Pesaran and Shin Unit root t e s t s on log− l e v e l s
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log Red Rate w/ Constant ”)
l r e d r a t e
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log Real Cash Refund w/
Constant ”) l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log Real PCPI w/ Constant ”)
l r e a l p c p i
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@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log Real Gas Pr i ce w/
Constant ”) l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log SC Pop w/ Constant ”)
l s c p o p
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , det=trend , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log Red Rate w/
Constant and Trend ”) l r e d r a t e
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , det=trend , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log Real Cash
Refund w/ Constant and Trend ”) l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , det=trend , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log Real PCPI w/
Constant and Trend ”) l r e a l p c p i
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , det=trend , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log Real Gas
Pr i ce w/ Constant and Trend ”) l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , det=trend , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : Log SC Pop w/
Constant and Trend ”) l s c p o p
∗Im , Pesaran and Shin Unit root t e s t s on d i f f e r e n c e d log− l e v e l s
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : DLog Red Rate ”) d l r e d r a t e
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : DLog Real Cash Refund ”)
d l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : DLog Real PCPI”)
d l r e a l p c p i
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : DLog Real Gas Pr i ce ”)
d l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@ipshin ( c r i t=aic , t i t l e =”IPS Unit Root Test : DLog SC Pop”) d l s c pop
∗Panel c o i n t e g r a t i o n t e s t − Pedroni w/ common time dummies , no trend
@pancoint (tdum)
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
@pancoint (tdum)
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i
@pancoint (tdum)
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@pancoint (tdum)
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e l s c p o p
@pancoint (tdum)
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@pancoint (tdum)
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l s c p o p
∗Panel c o i n t e g r a t i o n t e s t − Pedroni w/ common time dummies and trend
@pancoint (tdum , trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
@pancoint (tdum , trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i
@pancoint (tdum , trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@pancoint (tdum , trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e l s c p o p
@pancoint (tdum , trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l g a s p r i c e
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@pancoint (tdum , trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l s c p o p
∗ F i r s t d i f f e r e n c e d e s t imat i on
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e l s c p o p
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l g a s p r i c e
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l s c p o p
∗ F i r s t d i f f e r e n c e d e s t imat i on − sample per iod 1990 to 2000
s e t panelsmpl = %per iod ( t ) >=1990:1.and.% per iod ( t )<=2000:1
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) , smpl=panelsmpl ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) , smpl=panelsmpl ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) , smpl=panelsmpl ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) , smpl=panelsmpl ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e l s c p o p
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) , smpl=panelsmpl ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l g a s p r i c e
p r e g r e s s ( method=fd , c l u s t e r=%ind iv ( t ) , smpl=panelsmpl ) l r e d r a t e
# l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l s c p o p
∗Further e x p l o r a t i o n : Panel c o i n t e g r a t i o n t e s t − Pedroni w/ out common
time dummies and trend
@pancoint
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
@pancoint
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i
@pancoint
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@pancoint
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e l s c p o p
@pancoint
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@pancoint
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l s c p o p
∗Further e x p l o r a t i o n : Panel c o i n t e g r a t i o n t e s t − Pedroni w/ out common
time dummies but w/ trend
@pancoint ( trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
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@pancoint ( trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i
@pancoint ( trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@pancoint ( trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e l s c p o p
@pancoint ( trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@pancoint ( trend )
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l s c p o p
∗Further e x p l o r a t i o n : Panel FMOLS es t imat i on
@panelfm
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d
@panelfm
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i
@panelfm
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@panelfm
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l p c p i l r e a l g a s p r i c e l s c p o p
@panelfm
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l r e a l g a s p r i c e
@panelfm
# l r e d r a t e l r e a l c a s h r e f u n d l s c p o p
C.2 Code for Chapter 3 Using Matlab




T = 30 ;
T = f l o o r (T) ;
d e l t a = . 0 0 9 5 ;
alpha = . 6 ;
beta = . 3 9 ;
phi = . 0 0 5 ;
ups i l on = . 0 3 ;
sigmaCONS = 2 ;
sigmaLEISURE = 0 . 1 ;
p s i = . 0 0 0 2 ;
sbar = 50 ;
wage0 = 115 ;
g0 = 1000 ;
h = 1 ;
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kappa wage = . 0 2 ;
kappa g = . 0 2 ;
d i s c ou n t r a t e = . 1 ;
rho = 1/(1+ d i s c ou nt r a t e ) ;
wage = wage0∗(1+kappa wage ) . ˆ [ 1 :T ] ’ ;
g = g0∗(1+kappa g ) . ˆ [ 1 :T ] ’ ;
%State Space
S = ( 0 : sbar ) ’ ;
n = length (S) ;
St = repmat (S ’ , n , 1 ) ;
Stminusone = repmat (S , 1 , n ) ;
S d i f f = St−Stminusone ;
opt ions = opt imset ( ’ Algorithm ’ , ’ ac t ive−set ’ , ’ MaxIter ’ , 5 0 0 0 ) ;
opt i ons . Algorithm = ’ act ive−set ’ ;
opt i ons . MaxIter = 5000 ;
opt ions . MaxFunEvals = 5000 ;
wageterm = wage (T, 1 ) ;
gterm = g (T, 1 ) ;
lbterm = 0 ;
ubterm = −( d e l t a ∗wageterm ∗(sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−
sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) ) ./((−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm−phi ∗(
sigmaCONS−h∗wageterm+sigmaLEISURE∗wageterm )−beta ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+
sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) ) ;
f o r i =1: sbar+1
f o r j =1: sbar+1
Stterm = St ( i , j ) ;
Stminusoneterm = Stminusone ( i , j ) ;
thetatermGUESS = ( wageterm.∗(−(−1+ alpha+beta+phi ) ∗ ups i l on ∗(
sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm )+de l t a ∗( ups i l on ∗
wageterm . ∗ ( sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+Stterm−Stminusoneterm+
alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm )+gterm∗phi . ∗ ( sigmaCONS−h∗
wageterm+sigmaLEISURE∗wageterm ) ) ) ) . / ( ups i l on ∗wageterm . ∗ (
sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+Stterm−Stminusoneterm+alpha ∗(h−
sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm )+(−1+alpha+beta ) ∗phi ∗(sigmaCONS−h∗
wageterm+sigmaLEISURE∗wageterm ) .ˆ2+ phi ˆ 2 .∗ ( sigmaCONS−h∗
wageterm+sigmaLEISURE∗wageterm ) .ˆ2+ gterm∗phi ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+
sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) ) ;
thetaterm ( i , j ) = fmincon ( ’ MaxUtil ity SGLinearEngel ’ ,
thetatermGUESS , [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , lbterm , ubterm , ’
GovernmentBudgetConstraint SGLinearEngel ’ , opt ions , alpha , beta
, phi , h , de l ta , wageterm , gterm , Stterm , Stminusoneterm , ups i lon ,




gamterm = ( phi ∗( thetaterm−d e l t a ∗wageterm ) . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE)
.∗wageterm ) ) . / ( wageterm.∗((−1+ alpha+beta+phi ) . ∗ ( h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗
wageterm−sigmaCONS∗(−1+alpha+beta+phi+thetaterm−alpha ∗ thetaterm+(−1+
alpha ) ∗ d e l t a .∗wageterm )−(thetaterm−d e l t a ∗wageterm ) . ∗ ( St−Stminusone+
alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) ) ) ;
csterm = −(phi ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) ) . / ( gamterm .∗
wageterm ) ;
drterm = ((−1+alpha+beta+phi ) ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) )
./(− thetaterm+d e l t a ∗wageterm ) ;
l e i s u r e t e r m = repmat ( sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE∗
wageterm ) . / wageterm ) , sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
laborterm = (−( beta+phi ) ∗sigmaCONS∗ thetaterm+( d e l t a ∗(sigmaCONS−alpha ∗
sigmaCONS)+(−1+beta+phi ) ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗ thetaterm ) .∗wageterm+
alpha ∗ d e l t a ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm . ˆ 2 ) . / ( wageterm .∗(− thetaterm+
d e l t a ∗wageterm ) ) ;
consterm = repmat (sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗
wageterm , sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
zterm = consterm−csterm−drterm ;
testgspendterm = gterm−thetaterm .∗ drterm−ups i l on . / gamterm ;
te s tconste rm = consterm−wageterm .∗ laborterm−thetaterm .∗ drterm ;
tes t t imeterm = h−l e i su r e t e rm−laborterm−gamterm .∗ csterm−d e l t a ∗drterm ;
vterm = alpha ∗ l og ( consterm−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og ( l e i su r e t e rm−sigmaLEISURE
)+phi ∗ l og ( csterm )+(1−alpha−beta−phi ) ∗ l og ( drterm )+p s i ∗( gterm−ups i l on
. / gamterm−thetaterm .∗ drterm ) ;
vterm = vterm ( : , 1 ) ;
vterm ( imag ( vterm )>0) = − i n f ;
vmatrix = ones ( l ength (S) ,1 ) ∗vterm ’ ;
f o r t=T−1:−1:1
wage1 = wage ( t , 1 ) ;
g1 = g ( t , 1 ) ;
lb = 0 ;
ub = −( d e l t a ∗wage1 ∗(sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE
) .∗wage1 ) ) ./((−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1−phi ∗(sigmaCONS−h∗wage1+
sigmaLEISURE∗wage1 )−beta ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) ) ;
f o r i =1: sbar+1
f o r j =1: sbar+1
St1 = St ( i , j ) ;
Stminusone1 = Stminusone ( i , j ) ;
thetaGUESS = ( wage1.∗(−(−1+ alpha+beta+phi ) ∗ ups i l on ∗(
sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 )+d e l t a ∗( ups i l on ∗wage1
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. ∗ ( sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+St1−Stminusone1+alpha ∗(h−
sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 )+g1∗phi . ∗ ( sigmaCONS−h∗wage1+
sigmaLEISURE∗wage1 ) ) ) ) . / ( ups i l on ∗wage1 . ∗ ( sigmaCONS−alpha
∗sigmaCONS+St1−Stminusone1+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1
)+(−1+alpha+beta ) ∗phi ∗(sigmaCONS−h∗wage1+sigmaLEISURE∗
wage1 ) .ˆ2+ phi ˆ 2 .∗ ( sigmaCONS−h∗wage1+sigmaLEISURE∗wage1 )
.ˆ2+g1∗phi . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) ) ;
theta ( i , j ) = fmincon ( ’ MaxUtil ity SGLinearEngel ’ , thetaGUESS
, [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , lb , ub , ’
GovernmentBudgetConstraint SGLinearEngel ’ , opt ions , alpha ,
beta , phi , h , de l ta , wage1 , g1 , St1 , Stminusone1 , ups i lon ,
sigmaCONS , sigmaLEISURE , p s i ) ;
end
end
gam = ( phi . ∗ ( theta−d e l t a ∗wage1 ) . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) )
. / ( wage1 .∗((−1+ alpha+beta+phi ) . ∗ ( h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1−sigmaCONS
∗(−1+alpha+beta+phi+theta−alpha ∗ theta+(−1+alpha ) ∗ d e l t a .∗wage1 )−(
theta−d e l t a ∗wage1 ) . ∗ ( St−Stminusone+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) ) ) ;
c s = −(phi ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) ) . / ( gam.∗wage1 ) ;
dr = ((−1+alpha+beta+phi ) ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) ) ./(−
theta+d e l t a ∗wage1 ) ;
l e i s u r e = repmat ( sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE∗wage1 ) . /
wage1 ) , sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
l abor = (−( beta+phi ) ∗sigmaCONS∗ theta+( d e l t a ∗(sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS)
+(−1+beta+phi ) ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗ theta ) .∗wage1+alpha ∗ d e l t a ∗(h−
sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 . ˆ 2 ) . / ( wage1 .∗(− theta+d e l t a ∗wage1 ) ) ;
cons = repmat (sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage1 ,
sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
z = cons−cs−dr ;
z = cons−cs−dr ;
t e s tgspend = g1−theta .∗ dr−ups i l on . /gam ;
t e s t c o n s = cons−wage1 .∗ labor−theta .∗ dr ;
t e s t t ime = h−l e i s u r e−labor−gam.∗ cs−d e l t a ∗dr ;
payo f f = alpha ∗ l og ( cons−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og ( l e i s u r e−sigmaLEISURE)+phi ∗
l og ( cs )+(1−alpha−beta−phi ) ∗ l og ( dr )+p s i ∗( g1−ups i l on . /gam−theta .∗ dr ) ;
payo f f = t r i l ( payo f f ) ;
payo f f ( payo f f==0) = − i n f ;
addedbene f i t = rho∗vmatrix ;
va lue = payo f f+addedbene f i t ;
va lue = t r i l ( va lue ) ;
va lue ( va lue==0) = − i n f ;
va lue ( imag ( value )>0) = − i n f ;
[ va l row ] = max( value , [ ] , 2 ) ;
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f o r i =1: l ength (S)
gammarecords ( i , t ) = gam( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
t h e t a r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = theta ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
z r e co rd s ( i , t ) = z ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
cons r e co rds ( i , t ) = cons ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
d r r e co rds ( i , t ) = dr ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
l e i s u r e r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = l e i s u r e ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
c s r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = cs ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
l a b o r r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = labor ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
end
rows ( : , t ) = row ;
v a l s ( : , t ) = va l ;
end
%Simulat ion
f o r t =1:1 :T−1
i f t==1
s index = length (S) ;
steeminusone = S( s index ) ;
s t e e = S( s index ) ;
gamma sim = gammarecords ( s index , t ) ;
theta s im = th e t a r e c o rd s ( s index , t ) ;
c s s im = c s r e c o r d s ( s index , t ) ;
dr s im = drreco rds ( s index , t ) ;
l e i s u r e s i m = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s ( s index , t ) ;
l abor s im = l a b o r r e c o r d s ( s index , t ) ;
cons s im = cons r eco rds ( s index , t ) ;
z s im = zre co rd s ( s index , t ) ;
s t e e check = steeminusone − cons s im + cs s im + dr s im ;
s t e e = round ( s t e echeck ) ;
s index = f i n d (S==s t e e ) ;
steeminusone = s t e e ;
e l s e
gamma sim = gammarecords ( s index , t ) ;
theta s im = th e t a r e c o rd s ( s index , t ) ;
c s s im = c s r e c o r d s ( s index , t ) ;
dr s im = drreco rds ( s index , t ) ;
l e i s u r e s i m = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s ( s index , t ) ;
l abor s im = l a b o r r e c o r d s ( s index , t ) ;
cons s im = cons r eco rds ( s index , t ) ;
z s im = zre co rd s ( s index , t ) ;
s t e e check = steeminusone − cons s im + cs s im + dr s im ;
s t e e = round ( s t e echeck ) ;
s index = f i n d (S==s t e e ) ;
steeminusone = s t e e ;
end
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gamma sims ( t , 1 ) = gamma sim ;
the ta s ims ( t , 1 ) = theta s im ;
c s s ims ( t , 1 ) = cs s im ;
dr s ims ( t , 1 ) = dr s im ;
l e i s u r e s i m s ( t , 1 ) = l e i s u r e s i m ;
l abo r s ims ( t , 1 ) = labor s im ;
cons s ims ( t , 1 ) = cons s im ;
S s ims ( t , 1 ) = s t e e ;
z s ims ( t , 1 ) = z s im ;
end
t e s t t i m e = h − gamma sims .∗ c s s ims − l abo r s ims − dr s ims ∗ d e l t a −
l e i s u r e s i m s ;
t e s t g spend = g ( 1 :T−1 ,1) − ups i l on . / gamma sims − dr s ims .∗ the ta s ims ;
t e s t c o n s = cons s ims − the ta s ims .∗ dr s ims − wage ( 1 :T−1 ,1) .∗ l abo r s ims
;
govtspendcs = ups i l on . / gamma sims ;
govtspenddr = the ta s ims .∗ dr s ims ;
govt spendcs share = govtspendcs . / ( govtspendcs+govtspenddr ) ;
govtspenddr share = govtspenddr . / ( govtspendcs+govtspenddr ) ;
d i s c f a c t o r = rho . ˆ ( 1 : 1 : T−1) ’ ;
dep l e t i on t ime = f i n d ( S s ims==0) ;
endoft ime = isempty ( dep l e t i on t ime ) ;
dep l e t i on t ime ( endoft ime==1)=T;
dep l e t i on t ime=dep l e t i on t ime (1 , 1 ) ;
i f dep le t iont ime<T
s i m u l a t e d u t i l = alpha ∗ l og ( cons s ims ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime )−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗
l og ( l e i s u r e s i m s ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime )−sigmaLEISURE)+phi ∗ l og ( c s s ims ( 1 :
dep l e t i on t ime ) )+(1−alpha−beta−phi ) ∗ l og ( dr s ims ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime ) )+p s i
∗( g ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime )−ups i l on . / gamma sims ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime )−dr s ims ( 1 :
dep l e t i on t ime ) .∗ the ta s ims ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime ) ) ;
a d d e d u t i l = ( 1 . / d i s c o un t ra t e ) .∗ exp(−d i s c ou n t r a t e ∗ dep l e t i on t ime ) . ∗ ( (
alpha ∗ l og ( ( c s s ims ( dep le t iont ime , 1 )+dr s ims ( dep le t iont ime , 1 ) )−
sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og ( l e i s u r e s i m s ( dep le t iont ime , 1 )−sigmaLEISURE)+phi ∗
l og ( c s s ims ( dep le t iont ime , 1 ) )+(1−alpha−beta−phi ) ∗ l og ( dr s ims (
dep le t iont ime , 1 ) ) )+p s i ∗( g ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime )−ups i l on . / gamma sims ( 1 :
dep l e t i on t ime )−dr s ims ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime ) .∗ the ta s ims ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime )
) ) ;
n p v u t i l = −(sum( s i m u l a t e d u t i l .∗ d i s c f a c t o r ( 1 : dep l e t i on t ime ) )+
a d d e d u t i l ) ;
e l s e
s i m u l a t e d u t i l = alpha ∗ l og ( cons s ims ( 1 : dep le t iont ime −1)−sigmaCONS)+
beta ∗ l og ( l e i s u r e s i m s ( 1 : dep le t iont ime −1)−sigmaLEISURE)+phi ∗ l og (
c s s ims ( 1 : dep le t iont ime −1) )+(1−alpha−beta−phi ) ∗ l og ( dr s ims ( 1 :
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dep le t iont ime −1) )+p s i ∗( g ( 1 : dep le t iont ime −1)−ups i l on . / gamma sims
( 1 : dep le t iont ime −1)−dr s ims ( 1 : dep le t iont ime −1) .∗ the ta s ims ( 1 :
dep le t iont ime −1) ) ;
a d d e d u t i l = ( 1 . / d i s c o un t ra t e ) .∗ exp(−d i s c ou n t r a t e ∗ dep l e t i on t ime )
. ∗ ( ( alpha ∗ l og ( ( csterm+drterm )−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og ( l e i su r e t e rm−
sigmaLEISURE)+phi ∗ l og ( csterm )+(1−alpha−beta−phi ) ∗ l og ( drterm ) )+
p s i ∗( gterm−ups i l on . / gamterm−drterm .∗ theta ) ) ;
a d d e d u t i l = a d d e d u t i l ( 1 , 1 ) ;
n p v u t i l = −(sum( s i m u l a t e d u t i l .∗ d i s c f a c t o r ( 1 : dep le t iont ime −1) )+
a d d e d u t i l ) ;
end
r e s u l t s . npv = n p v u t i l ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . cons = cons s ims ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . c s = c s s ims ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . dr = dr s ims ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . l e i s u r e = l e i s u r e s i m s ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . l abor = labo r s ims ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . S = S sims ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . theta = the ta s ims ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . gamma = gamma sims ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . t e s t t i m e = t e s t t i m e ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . t e s t g spend = te s t g spend ( : , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s . t e s t c o n s = t e s t c o n s ( : , 1 ) ;
r e c y s h a r e c s = c s s ims . / ( c s s ims+dr s ims ) ;
r e cy s ha r e d r = dr s ims . / ( c s s ims+dr s ims ) ;
r e c y c l i n g t i m e = gamma sims .∗ c s s ims+d e l t a ∗ dr s ims ;
%Plot Figures
f i g u r e
p l o t ( govtspendcs share , ’ red ’ ) ;
hold on
p lo t ( govtspenddr share ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’ Shares o f Govt Spending ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( govtspendcs , ’ red ’ ) ;
hold on
p lo t ( govtspenddr ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’ Leve l s o f Govt Spending ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( S s ims ) ;
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t i t l e ( ’ L a n d f i l l Deplet ion ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( cs s ims , ’ red ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( dr s ims ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’ Leve l s DR vs CS ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( r e cy sha r e c s , ’ red ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( r e c y sh a r e d r ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’DR Share vs CS Share ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( r e cyc l i ng t ime , ’ green ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( l abor s ims , ’ blue ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( l e i s u r e s i m s , ’ black ’ ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’ Labor−Leisure−Recyc l ing Share ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( cons s ims ) ;
t i t l e ( ’ Consumption ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( te s t gspend , ’ green ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( t e s t c o n s , ’ blue ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( t e s t t ime , ’ black ’ ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’ Government Spending Check (=0) ’ ) ;
C.2.2 Optimization Code
f unc t i on [ MaximizeUtil itySG ] = MaxUti l ity SGLinearEngel ( theta , alpha ,
beta , phi , h , de l ta , wage , g , St , Stminusone , ups i lon , sigmaCONS , sigmaLEISURE
, p s i )
gam max = ( phi ∗( theta−d e l t a ∗wage ) . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage ) )
. / ( wage.∗((−1+ alpha+beta+phi ) . ∗ ( h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage−sigmaCONS∗(−1+
alpha+beta+phi+theta−alpha ∗ theta+(−1+alpha ) ∗ d e l t a .∗wage )−(theta−
d e l t a ∗wage ) . ∗ ( St−Stminusone+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage ) ) ) ;
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cs max = −(phi ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage ) ) . / ( gam max .∗wage ) ;
dr max = ((−1+alpha+beta+phi ) ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage ) ) ./(−
theta+d e l t a ∗wage ) ;
l e i su r e max = sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE∗wage ) . / wage )
;
labor max = (−( beta+phi ) ∗sigmaCONS∗ theta+( d e l t a ∗(sigmaCONS−alpha ∗
sigmaCONS)+(−1+beta+phi ) ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗ theta ) .∗wage+alpha ∗ d e l t a
∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage . ˆ 2 ) . / ( wage .∗(− theta+d e l t a ∗wage ) ) ;
cons max = sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage ;
z max = cons max−cs max−dr max ;
MaximizeUtil itySG = −(alpha ∗ l og ( cons max−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og (
l e i sure max−sigmaLEISURE)+phi ∗ l og ( cs max )+(1−alpha−beta−phi ) ∗ l og (
dr max )+p s i ∗( g−theta .∗ dr max−ups i l on . / gam max) ) ;
C.2.3 Constraint Code
f unc t i on [ c , ceq ] = GovernmentBudgetConstraint SGLinearEngel ( theta , alpha
, beta , phi , h , de l ta , wage , g , St , Stminusone , ups i lon , sigmaCONS ,
sigmaLEISURE , p s i )
gam constra int = ( phi ∗( theta−d e l t a ∗wage ) . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE)
.∗wage ) ) . / ( wage.∗((−1+ alpha+beta+phi ) . ∗ ( h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage−
sigmaCONS∗(−1+alpha+beta+phi+theta−alpha ∗ theta+(−1+alpha ) ∗ d e l t a .∗
wage )−(theta−d e l t a ∗wage ) . ∗ ( St−Stminusone+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗
wage ) ) ) ;
c s c o n s t r a i n t = −(phi ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage ) ) . / (
gam constra int .∗wage ) ;
d r c o n s t r a i n t = ((−1+alpha+beta+phi ) ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage
) ) ./(− theta+d e l t a ∗wage ) ;
l e i s u r e c o n s t r a i n t = sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE∗wage )
. / wage ) ;
l a b o r c o n s t r a i n t = (−( beta+phi ) ∗sigmaCONS∗ theta+( d e l t a ∗(sigmaCONS−alpha
∗sigmaCONS)+(−1+beta+phi ) ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗ theta ) .∗wage+alpha ∗ d e l t a
∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage . ˆ 2 ) . / ( wage .∗(− theta+d e l t a ∗wage ) ) ;
c o n s c o n s t r a i n t = sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage
;
z c o n s t r a i n t = c ons con s t r a in t−c s c o n s t r a i n t−d r c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (1 ) = −g+theta .∗ d r c o n s t r a i n t+ups i l on . / gam constra int ;
c (2 ) = −c o n s c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (3 ) = −c s c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (4 ) = −d r c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (5 ) = −h+l a b o r c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (6 ) = −h+l e i s u r e c o n s t r a i n t ;
ceq (1 ) = wage∗ l a b o r c o n s t r a i n t+theta ∗ d r c o n s t r a i n t−c o n s c o n s t r a i n t ;
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ceq (2 ) = −h+l e i s u r e c o n s t r a i n t+l a b o r c o n s t r a i n t+gam constra int .∗
c s c o n s t r a i n t+d e l t a ∗ d r c o n s t r a i n t ;
C.3 Code for Chapter 4 Using Matlab




T = 50 ;
d e l t a = . 0 0 1 ;
alpha = . 7 ;
beta = . 2 5 ;
sigmaCONS = 50 ;
sigmaLEISURE = . 1 ;
p s i = . 0 0 1 ;
p i = . 1 5 ;
Pp = 5∗(1− .0) . ˆ [ 1 :T ] ’ ;
sbar = 50 ;
wage0 = 70 ;
g0 = 1000 ;
h = 1 ;
omega = 0.25∗(1− .0) . ˆ [ 1 :T ] ’ ;
e ta = 1 . 5 ;
kappa wage = . 0 2 1 ;
kappa g = . 0 2 1 ;
d i s c ou n t r a t e = . 1 ;
rho = 1/(1+ d i s c ou nt r a t e ) ;
wage = wage0∗(1+kappa wage ) . ˆ [ 1 :T ] ’ ;
g = g0∗(1+kappa g ) . ˆ [ 1 :T ] ’ ;
%State Space
S = ( 0 : sbar ) ’ ;
n = length (S) ;
Stee = repmat (S ’ , n∗2 ,2) ;
Steeminusone = repmat (S , 2 , n∗2) ;
St = repmat (S ’ , n , 1 ) ;
Stminusone = repmat (S , 1 , n ) ;
S d i f f = Stee−Steeminusone ;
opt ions = opt imset ( ’ Algorithm ’ , ’ ac t ive−set ’ , ’ MaxIter ’ , 5 0 0 0 ) ;
opt i ons . Algorithm = ’ act ive−set ’ ;
opt i ons . MaxIter = 5000 ;
opt ions . MaxFunEvals = 5000 ;
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wageterm = wage (T, 1 ) ;
gterm = g (T, 1 ) ;
thetaterm = (h∗wageterm+sigmaCONS∗(−1+alpha+beta+(−1+alpha ) ∗ d e l t a ∗
wageterm )−wageterm ∗( sigmaLEISURE+d e l t a ∗( St−Stminusone )+(h−
sigmaLEISURE) ∗( alpha+beta+alpha ∗ d e l t a ∗wageterm ) ) ) ./((−1+ alpha ) ∗
sigmaCONS−St+Stminusone+alpha∗(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) ;
dterm = ((−1+alpha+beta ) . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) ) ./(−
thetaterm+d e l t a ∗wageterm ) ;
consterm = repmat (sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗
wageterm , ( sbar +1) , ( sbar +1) ) ;
l a n d f i l l t e r m = consterm−dterm ;
l e i s u r e t e r m = repmat ( sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE .∗
wageterm ) . / wageterm ) , sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
laborterm = h−l e i su r e t e rm−d e l t a ∗dterm ;
lbterm = 0 ;
ubterm = ( d e l t a ∗gterm∗wageterm ) . / ( gterm+(−1+alpha+beta ) ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+
sigmaLEISURE) ∗wageterm ) ) ;
%With Investment to Investment
f o r i =1: sbar+1
Stterm = sbar ;
Stminusoneterm = Stminusone ( i ) ;
thetatermGUESS = ubterm . / 2 ;
theta invterm1 ( i ) = fmincon ( ’ chapte r4 u t i l i t ymax imi za t i on ’ ,
thetatermGUESS , [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , lbterm , ubterm , ’
c h a p t e r 4 u t i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t ’ , opt ions , alpha , beta , h , de l ta , wageterm ,
gterm , Stterm , Stminusoneterm , sigmaCONS , sigmaLEISURE , ps i , pi , Pp(T) ,
omega (T) ) ;
end
thetainvtermMAT = ze ro s ( l ength ( theta invterm1 ) , l ength ( theta invterm1 ) ) ;
f o r i=sbar +1:−1:1
theta invterm = c i r c s h i f t ( thetainvterm1 , [ 1 , i ] ) ;
thetainvtermMAT ( i , : ) = theta invterm ;
end
dinvterm = ((−1+alpha+beta ) . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wageterm ) )
./(− thetainvtermMAT+d e l t a ∗wageterm ) ;
consinvterm = repmat (sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗
wageterm , ( sbar +1) , ( sbar +1) ) ;
z invterm = ( St−Stminusone+(consinvterm−dinvterm ) ) ./(1− pi ) ;
z invterm ( zinvterm<0) = 0 ;
zPOWERinvterm = (1−pi ) ∗ zinvterm ;
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zLANDinvterm = pi ∗ zinvterm ;
LANDinvterm1 = consinvterm−dinvterm−zinvterm ;
l a n d f i l l i n v t e r m c h e c k = LANDinvterm1+zLANDinvterm ;
l e i s u r e i n v t e r m = repmat ( sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE .∗
wageterm ) . / wageterm ) , sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
labor invterm = h−l e i s u r e i nv t e rm−d e l t a ∗dinvterm ;
l a n d f i l l i n v t e r m = ( consinvterm−dinvterm−(1−pi ) ∗ zinvterm ) ;
%Compilation
Dterm = [ dterm , dinvterm ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN, dinvterm ] ;
THETAterm = [ thetaterm , thetainvtermMAT ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN,
thetainvtermMAT ] ;
CONSterm = [ consterm , consterm ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN, consterm ] ;
LANDFILLterm = [ l a n d f i l l t e r m , l a n d f i l l i n v t e r m ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN,
l a n d f i l l i n v t e r m ] ;
POWERterm = [ ze ro s ( sbar +1, sbar +1) ,zPOWERinvterm ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗
NaN, zPOWERinvterm ] ;
LEISUREterm = [ l e i su r e t e rm , l e i s u r e i n v t e r m ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN,
l e i s u r e i n v t e r m ] ;
LABORterm = [ laborterm , labor invterm ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN,
labor invterm ] ;
LABORterm(LABORterm<0) = NaN;
LABORterm(LABORterm>h) = NaN;
InvCost = [ z e r o s ( sbar +1, sbar +1) , ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) ; z e r o s ( sbar +1, sbar
+1) , z e r o s ( sbar +1, sbar +1) ] ;
Investmentcostterm = eta .∗ InvCost ;
Powernetbenef i t s term = Pp(T) ∗POWERterm−omega (T) . ∗ ( (POWERterm. ˆ 2 ) . / 2 )−
Investmentcostterm ;
Ut i l Excessbudgetterm = p s i ∗( gterm−Dterm .∗THETAterm+
Powernetbenef i t s term ) ;
Ut i l t e rm = alpha ∗ l og (CONSterm−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og (LEISUREterm−
sigmaLEISURE)+(1−alpha−beta ) ∗ l og (Dterm) ;
vterm = Ut i l t e rm+Uti l Excessbudgetterm ;
vterm ( i snan ( vterm ) ) = − i n f ;
vterm ( imag ( vterm )>0) = − i n f ;
vmatrix = [ ones ( l ength (S) ,1 ) ∗vterm ( 1 : sbar +1 ,1) ’ , ones ( l ength (S) ,1 ) ∗vterm
( 1 : sbar +1, sbar +2) ’ ; ones ( l ength (S) ,1 ) ∗vterm ( sbar +2:end , 1 ) ’ , ones (
l ength (S) ,1 ) ∗vterm ( sbar +2:end , sbar +2) ’ ] ;
vmatrix ( vmatrix==0) = − i n f ;
f o r t=T:−1:1
wage1 = wage ( t , 1 ) ;
g1 = g ( t , 1 ) ;
%No Investment
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theta = (h∗wage1+sigmaCONS∗(−1+alpha+beta+(−1+alpha ) ∗ d e l t a ∗wage1 )−
wage1 ∗( sigmaLEISURE+d e l t a ∗( St−Stminusone )+(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗(
alpha+beta+alpha ∗ d e l t a ∗wage1 ) ) ) ./((−1+ alpha ) ∗sigmaCONS−St+
Stminusone+alpha∗(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) ;
d = ((−1+alpha+beta ) . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) ) ./(−
theta+d e l t a ∗wage1 ) ;
cons = repmat (sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗
wage1 , ( sbar +1) , ( sbar +1) ) ;
l a n d f i l l = cons−d ;
l e i s u r e = repmat ( sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE .∗
wage1 ) . / wage1 ) , sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
l abor = h−l e i s u r e−d e l t a ∗d ;
lb = 0 ;
ub = ( d e l t a ∗g1∗wage1 ) . / ( g1+(−1+alpha+beta ) ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+
sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage1 ) ) ;
%With Investment to Investment
f o r i =1: sbar+1
St1 = sbar ;
Stminusone1 = Stminusone ( i ) ;
thetaGUESS = ub . / 2 ;
theta inv1 ( i ) = fmincon ( ’ chapte r4 u t i l i t ymax imi za t i on ’ ,
thetaGUESS , [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , lb , ub , ’ c h a p t e r 4 u t i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t ’ ,
opt ions , alpha , beta , h , de l ta , wage1 , g1 , St1 , Stminusone1 ,
sigmaCONS , sigmaLEISURE , ps i , pi , Pp( t ) , omega ( t ) ) ;
end
thetainvMAT = ze ro s ( l ength ( theta inv1 ) , l ength ( theta inv1 ) ) ;
f o r i=sbar +1:−1:1
the ta inv = c i r c s h i f t ( theta inv1 , [ 1 , i ] ) ;
thetainvMAT ( i , : ) = theta inv ;
end
dinv = ((−1+alpha+beta ) . ∗ ( sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) .∗wage1 ) ) ./(−
thetainvMAT+de l t a ∗wage1 ) ;
cons inv = repmat (sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗
wage1 , ( sbar +1) , ( sbar +1) ) ;
z inv = ( St−Stminusone+(consinv−dinv ) ) ./(1− pi ) ;
z inv ( zinv<0) = 0 ;
zPOWERinv = (1−pi ) ∗ z inv ;
zLANDinv = pi ∗ z inv ;
LANDinv1 = consinv−dinv−z inv ;
l a n d f i l l i n v c h e c k = LANDinv1+zLANDinv ;
l e i s u r e i n v = repmat ( sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE .∗
wage1 ) . / wage1 ) , sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
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l abo r inv = h−l e i s u r e i n v−d e l t a ∗dinv ;
l a n d f i l l i n v = ( consinv−dinv−(1−pi ) ∗ z inv ) ;
%Compilation
D = [ d , dinv ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN, dinv ] ;
THETA = [ theta , thetainvMAT ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN, thetainvMAT ] ;
CONS = [ cons , cons ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN, cons ] ;
LANDFILL = [ l a n d f i l l , l a n d f i l l i n v ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN,
l a n d f i l l i n v ] ;
POWER = [ ze ro s ( sbar +1, sbar +1) ,zPOWERinv ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN,
zPOWERinv ] ;
LEISURE = [ l e i s u r e , l e i s u r e i n v ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN, l e i s u r e i n v ] ;
LABOR = [ labor , l abo r inv ; ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) .∗NaN, l abo r inv ] ;
LABOR(LABOR<0) = NaN;
LABOR(LABOR>h) = NaN;
InvCost = [ z e r o s ( sbar +1, sbar +1) , ones ( sbar +1, sbar +1) ; z e r o s ( sbar +1,
sbar +1) , z e r o s ( sbar +1, sbar +1) ] ;
Investmentcost = eta .∗ InvCost ;
Powernetbene f i t s = Pp( t ) ∗POWER−omega ( t ) . ∗ ( (POWER. ˆ 2 ) . / 2 )−
Investmentcost ;
Ut i l Exces sbudget = p s i ∗( g1−D.∗THETA+Powernetbene f i t s ) ;
U t i l = alpha ∗ l og (CONS−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og (LEISURE−sigmaLEISURE)
+(1−alpha−beta ) ∗ l og (D) ;
payo f f = U t i l +Ut i l Exces sbudget ;
payoffD0D0 = t r i l ( payo f f ( 1 : sbar +1 ,1: sbar +1) ) ;
payoffD0D1 = t r i l ( payo f f ( 1 : sbar +1, sbar +2:end ) ) ;
payoffD1D0 = ze ro s ( sbar +1, sbar +1) ;
payoffD1D1 = t r i l ( payo f f ( sbar +2:end , sbar +2:end ) ) ;
t e s tgspend = g1+Powernetbene f i t s ;
t e s t c o n s = CONS−wage1 .∗LABOR−THETA.∗D;
t e s t t ime = h−LEISURE−LABOR−d e l t a .∗D;
payoffMat = [ payoffD0D0 , payoffD0D1 ; payoffD1D0 , payoffD1D1 ] ;
payoffMat ( payoffMat==0) = − i n f ;
payoffMat ( imag ( payoffMat )>0)=−i n f ;
payoffMat ( labor <0)=−i n f ;
payoffMat ( i snan ( payoffMat ) ) = − i n f ;
addedbene f i t = rho∗vmatrix ;
va lue = payoffMat+addedbene f i t ;
va lue ( imag ( value )>0)=−i n f ;
va lue ( i snan ( va lue ) ) = − i n f ;
va lue = r e a l ( va lue ) ;
[ va l row ] = max( value , [ ] , 2 ) ;
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f o r i =1: l ength ( va lue )
th e t a r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = THETA( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = LANDFILL( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
cons r e co rds ( i , t ) = CONS( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
drecords ( i , t ) = D( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
l e i s u r e r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = LEISURE( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
l a b o r r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = LABOR( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
Powerrecords ( i , t ) = POWER( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
t e s t g spendr e co rd s ( i , t ) = tes tgspend ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
t e s t c o n s r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = t e s t c o n s ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
t e s t t i m e r e c o r d s ( i , t ) = te s t t ime ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
va lue r e co rd s ( i , t ) = value ( i , row ( i , 1 ) ) ;
end
rows ( : , t ) = row ;
v a l s ( : , t ) = va l ;
end
l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s N I = l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
the tarecordsNI = th e t a r e c o rd s ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
consrecordsNI = cons r eco rds ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
drecordsNI = drecords ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
l e i s u r e r e c o r d s N I = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
l abor r ecordsNI = l a b o r r e c o r d s ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
PowerrecordsNI = Powerrecords ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
t e s tg spendrecordsNI = te s t g spendr e co rd s ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
t e s tbudget recordsNI = t e s t c o n s r e c o r d s ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
t e s t t imere co rdsNI = t e s t t i m e r e c o r d s ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
va luerecordsNI = va lue r e co rd s ( 1 : sbar +1 , : ) ;
l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s Y I = l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
the tarecordsYI = th e t a r e c o rd s ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
consrecordsYI = cons r eco rds ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
drecordsYI = drecords ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
l e i s u r e r e c o r d s Y I = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
l abor r ecordsYI = l a b o r r e c o r d s ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
PowerrecordsYI = Powerrecords ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
t e s tg spendrecordsYI = te s t g spendr e co rd s ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
t e s tbudget recordsYI = t e s t c o n s r e c o r d s ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
t e s t t imere co rdsYI = t e s t t i m e r e c o r d s ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
va luerecordsYI = va lue r e co rd s ( sbar +2:end , : ) ;
%Simulat ion
f o r t =1:1 :T−1
i f t==1
s index = length (S) ;
i f rows ( s index , t )<=sbar+1
steeminusone = S( s index ) ;
s t e e = S( s index ) ;
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investment = 0 ;
theta s im = thetarecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
d sim = drecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
l e i s u r e s i m = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s N I ( s index , t ) ;
l abor s im = labor reco rdsNI ( s index , t ) ;
cons s im = consrecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
l a n d f i l l s i m = l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s N I ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tg spend s im = tes tgspendrecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tbudget s im = tes tbudget recordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s t t ime s im = te s t t imereco rdsNI ( s index , t ) ;
Powerrecords s im = PowerrecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
va lue r e co rd s s im = va luerecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
s t e e check = steeminusone − l a n d f i l l s i m ;
s t e e = round ( s t e echeck ) ;
s index = f i n d (S==s t e e ) ;
steeminusone = s t e e ;
e l s e
steeminusone = S( s index ) ;
s t e e = S( s index ) ;
investment = 1 ;
theta s im = thetarecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
d sim = drecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
l e i s u r e s i m = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s Y I ( s index , t ) ;
l abor s im = labor reco rdsYI ( s index , t ) ;
cons s im = consrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
l a n d f i l l s i m = l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s Y I ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tg spend s im = tes tgspendrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tbudget s im = tes tbudget recordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s t t ime s im = te s t t imereco rdsYI ( s index , t ) ;
Powerrecords s im = PowerrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
va lue r e co rd s s im = va luerecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
s t e e check = steeminusone − l a n d f i l l s i m ;
s t e e = round ( s t e echeck ) ;
s index = f i n d (S==s t e e ) ;
steeminusone = s t e e ;
end
e l s e
i f investment s ims ( t−1 ,1)==0
investment = 0 ;
theta s im = thetarecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
d sim = drecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
l e i s u r e s i m = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s N I ( s index , t ) ;
l abor s im = labor reco rdsNI ( s index , t ) ;
cons s im = consrecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
l a n d f i l l s i m = l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s N I ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tg spend s im = tes tgspendrecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tbudget s im = tes tbudget recordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
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t e s t t ime s im = te s t t imereco rdsNI ( s index , t ) ;
Powerrecords s im = PowerrecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
va lue r e co rd s s im = va luerecordsNI ( s index , t ) ;
s t e e check = steeminusone − l a n d f i l l s i m ;
i f Powerrecords sim>0
investment = 1 ;
theta s im = thetarecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
d sim = drecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
l e i s u r e s i m = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s Y I ( s index , t ) ;
l abor s im = labor reco rdsYI ( s index , t ) ;
cons s im = consrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
l a n d f i l l s i m = l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s Y I ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tg spend s im = tes tgspendrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tbudget s im = tes tbudget recordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s t t ime s im = te s t t imereco rdsYI ( s index , t ) ;
Powerrecords s im = PowerrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
va lue r e co rd s s im = va luerecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
s t e e check = steeminusone − l a n d f i l l s i m ;
end
s t e e = round ( s t e echeck ) ;
s index = f i n d (S==s t e e ) ;
steeminusone = s t e e ;
e l s e
investment = 1 ;
theta s im = thetarecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
d sim = drecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
l e i s u r e s i m = l e i s u r e r e c o r d s Y I ( s index , t ) ;
l abor s im = labor reco rdsYI ( s index , t ) ;
cons s im = consrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
l a n d f i l l s i m = l a n d f i l l r e c o r d s Y I ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tg spend s im = tes tgspendrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s tbudget s im = tes tbudget recordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
t e s t t ime s im = te s t t imereco rdsYI ( s index , t ) ;
Powerrecords s im = PowerrecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
va lue r e co rd s s im = va luerecordsYI ( s index , t ) ;
s t e e check = steeminusone − l a n d f i l l s i m ;
s t e e = round ( s t e echeck ) ;
s index = f i n d (S==s t e e ) ;
steeminusone = s t e e ;
end
end
investment s ims ( t , 1 ) = investment ;
the ta s ims ( t , 1 ) = theta s im ;
d s ims ( t , 1 ) = d sim ;
l e i s u r e s i m s ( t , 1 ) = l e i s u r e s i m ;
l abo r s ims ( t , 1 ) = labor s im ;
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cons s ims ( t , 1 ) = cons s im ;
l a n d f i l l s i m s ( t , 1 ) = l a n d f i l l s i m ;
S s ims ( t , 1 ) = s t e e ;
t e s t t i m e c o n s t r a i n t ( t , 1 ) = te s t t ime s im ;
t e s t c o n s c o n s t r a i n t ( t , 1 ) = tes tbudget s im ;
t e s t g spend ( t , 1 ) = tes tg spend s im ;
Power sims ( t , 1 ) = Powerrecords s im ;
va lue s ims ( t , 1 ) = va lue r e co rd s s im ;
bego fpe r i od = S sims + cons s ims − d sims ;
end
r e c y c l i n g t i m e = de l t a ∗d sims ;
%Plot Figures
f i g u r e
p l o t ( cons s ims , ’ black ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( d sims , ’ green ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( Power sims , ’ red ’ ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’ Consumption v Recyc l ing v Power ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p lotyy ( 1 :T−1, S sims , 1 : T−1, investment s ims ) ;
t i t l e ( ’ Investment v Deplet ion ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( r e cyc l i ng t ime , ’ green ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( l abor s ims , ’ blue ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( l e i s u r e s i m s , ’ black ’ ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’ Labor−Leisure−Recyc l ing Share ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( t e s t t i m e c o n s t r a i n t , ’ green ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( te s t gspend , ’ blue ’ ) ;
hold on ;
p l o t ( t e s t c o n s c o n s t r a i n t , ’ black ’ ) ;
hold o f f ;
t i t l e ( ’ Test ing E q u a l i t i e s ’ ) ;
f i g u r e
p lotyy ( 1 :T−1,Power sims , 1 : T−1, d s ims ) ;
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t i t l e ( ’ Power v Recycl ing ’ ) ;
C.3.2 Optimization Code
f unc t i on [ ch4 maxut i l i t y ] = c h a p t e r 4 u t i l i t y m a x i m i z a t i o n ( theta , alpha ,
beta , h , de l ta , wage , g , St , Stminusone , sigmaCONS , sigmaLEISURE , ps i , pi , Pp ,
omega )
d max = ((−1+alpha+beta ) ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage ) ) ./(− theta+
d e l t a ∗wage ) ;
cons max = sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage ;
z max = ( St−Stminusone+(cons max−d max ) ) ./(1− pi ) ;
labor max = h−sigmaLEISURE+(beta ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage ) ) . /
wage−((−1+alpha+beta ) ∗ d e l t a ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage ) ) ./(−
theta+d e l t a ∗wage ) ;
l e i su r e max = sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE∗wage ) . / wage )
;
zPOWER max = (1−pi ) ∗z max ;
Powernetbenef i ts max = Pp∗zPOWER max−omega . ∗ (zPOWER max. ˆ 2 ) . / 2 ;
UtilExcessBudget max = p s i ∗( g−d max .∗ theta+Powernetbenef i ts max ) ;
ch4 maxut i l i t y = −(alpha ∗ l og ( cons max−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og ( l e i sure max−
sigmaLEISURE)+(1−alpha−beta ) ∗ l og ( d max )+UtilExcessBudget max ) ;
ch4 maxut i l i t y ( ch4 maxut i l i ty >0) = 0 ;
C.3.3 Constraint Code
f unc t i on [ c , ceq ] = c h a p t e r 4 u t i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t ( theta , alpha , beta , h , de l ta ,
wage , g , St , Stminusone , sigmaCONS , sigmaLEISURE , ps i , pi , Pp , omega )
d c o n s t r a i n t = ((−1+alpha+beta ) ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage ) ) ./(−
theta+d e l t a ∗wage ) ;
c o n s c o n s t r a i n t = sigmaCONS−alpha ∗sigmaCONS+alpha ∗(h−sigmaLEISURE) ∗wage
;
z c o n s t r a i n t = ( St−Stminusone+( con s con s t r a in t−d c o n s t r a i n t ) ) ./(1− pi ) ;
l a b o r c o n s t r a i n t = h−sigmaLEISURE+(beta ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) ∗
wage ) ) . / wage−((−1+alpha+beta ) ∗ d e l t a ∗(sigmaCONS+(−h+sigmaLEISURE) ∗
wage ) ) ./(− theta+d e l t a ∗wage ) ;
l e i s u r e c o n s t r a i n t = sigmaLEISURE+beta ∗(h−(sigmaCONS+sigmaLEISURE∗wage )
. / wage ) ;
zPOWER constraint = (1−pi ) ∗ z c o n s t r a i n t ;
P o w e r n e t b e n e f i t s c o n s t r a i n t = Pp∗zPOWER constraint−omega . ∗ (
zPOWER constraint . ˆ 2 ) . / 2 ;
Ut i lExce s sBudge t cons t ra in t = p s i ∗( g−d c o n s t r a i n t .∗ theta+
P o w e r n e t b e n e f i t s c o n s t r a i n t ) ;
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c h 4 c o n s t r a i n t u t i l i t y = −(alpha ∗ l og ( con s con s t r a in t−sigmaCONS)+beta ∗ l og
( l e i s u r e c o n s t r a i n t −sigmaLEISURE)+(1−alpha−beta ) ∗ l og ( d c o n s t r a i n t )+
Ut i lExce s sBudge t cons t ra in t ) ;
c (1 ) = −g−Ut i lExce s sBudge t cons t ra in t+theta .∗ d c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (2 ) = −c o n s c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (3 ) = −d c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (4 ) = −h+l a b o r c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (5 ) = −h+l e i s u r e c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (6 ) = −z c o n s t r a i n t ;
c (7 ) = −c o n s c o n s t r a i n t+d cons t ra in t−St+Stminusone ;
ceq (1 ) = wage∗ l a b o r c o n s t r a i n t+theta ∗ d cons t ra in t−c o n s c o n s t r a i n t ;
ceq (2 ) = −h+l e i s u r e c o n s t r a i n t+l a b o r c o n s t r a i n t+d e l t a ∗ d c o n s t r a i n t ;
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